Lustration, Transitional Justice, and Social Trust in Post-Communist Countries. 
Repairing or Wresting the Ties that Bind?

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Abstract

Interpersonal trust in post-communist societies is particularly low, and is often cited as an impediment to democratic consolidation. One way in which countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have tried to build trust is through transitional justice measures, particularly lustration or vetting policies. There is a direct relationship postulated between lustration, transitional justice, and social trust building. This paper tests this assumption by examining the impact of both targeted lustration and broader transitional justice programmes on social trust. The study finds there is a divergent impact of lustration on trust, both building particularised trust in social institutions and undermining generalised interpersonal trust.

TRUST HAS BEEN THEORISED AND EMPIRICALLY SHOWN TO BE an important factor contributing to the development of effective and capable democratic governance (Hardin 1998; Tyler 1998; Kornai & Rose-Ackerman 2004). Trust in national government, trust in public institutions, trust in social institutions, and interpersonal trust or social trust are all theorised as contributing to democratisation (Sztompka 1999; Kornai et al. 2004; Putnam 2000). A lack of trust in these realms is often seen as an impediment to democratic consolidation, as well as economic development. This connection has been highlighted quite explicitly in the case of post-communist transitions.

Low levels of both institutional and interpersonal trust are widely acknowledged legacies of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) (Rose et al. 1998; Rose-Ackerman 2001; Kornai et al. 2004). Some have even suggested that a culture of distrust plagues these societies: ‘One of the hallmarks of communist rule ... was the perversion of civic society. In place of a sense of community, these “societies” were instead marked by a mutual distrust between the state and its people, and between the people themselves’ (Gibney 1997, p. 95). Networks of secret police informers created generalised fear and distrust among citizens. The well documented nature of secret police activities during the communist period, and the post-regime revelations of vast files, in which spying by friends, colleagues, family, and spouses was revealed, demonstrated a rational basis for institutional and interpersonal
distrust, both during and after the communist period. In a 2007 speech in Budapest, Fukuyama stressed the communist legacy of distrust, and restated that ‘the primary task of the political elite in Hungary is to restore public trust’. This suggests, first, that trust can be created or facilitated, and second, that an increase in trust will support democratisation.

One way in which countries in the region have tried to build trust is through transitional justice policies. Transitional justice is most basically defined as the way a society confronts the wrongdoings in its past, with the goal of obtaining some combination of truth, justice, rule of law, and durable peace (Kritz 2009, p. 14). Politically, economically, and socially, transitional justice measures are envisioned as explicit and implicit agents of trust building. Justice and reconciliation are framed as trust-building experiences, creating the ‘soil in which democracy takes root’ (Sarkin & Daly 2004, p. 700). Policy makers and academics stress how transitional justice measures ‘instill trust in the new system and hence democratic stability’ (Grodsky 2010, p. 15). The objects of trust building vary, including the government, public institutions, and civic institutions or fellow citizens, but there is a uniform assumption that all contribute to democratisation.

There is a direct relationship postulated between transitional justice measures and both institutional and interpersonal trust building. Stan captures the trust-building assumptions in the literature when she explains,

Transitional justice rebuilds trust among citizens and between citizens and the state, and in doing so allows the community and the state to come together and solve the problems of the nation. Trust, in its turn, leads to the accumulation of rich social capital reserves, the formation of vibrant voluntary associations, and the rebirth of a strong civil society able to hold the state accountable for its actions. (2009, p. 3)

A number of complementary transitional justice measures have been adopted in the post-communist region with institutional and interpersonal trust-building goals in mind. These include facilitating access to secret police files, lustration, truth-telling exercises, trials, and property restitution. Lustration is one of the regionally dominant transitional justice measures opted for by almost all countries in CEE and some in the FSU as part of their post-communist transitions. Lustration is a specialised form of employment vetting, primarily ‘the banning of communist officials and secret political police officers and informers from post-communist politics and positions of influence in society’ (Stan 2009, p. 11). It has come to imply a larger process of renewal, capturing a sense of ‘the purification of state organizations from their sins under the communist regimes’ (Boed 1999, p. 358; David 2011, p. 54). Lustration programmes are framed as intentional trust-building measures, designed to restore trust in public institutions, interpersonal trust, and trust in government, and thereby positively contribute to the process of democratisation.

Despite the many assertions about the relationship between transitional justice in general and lustration specifically on trust, the evidence is more scant. There are relatively few impact studies of the effects of lustration and transitional justice measures, although new

attention is being directed to this line of inquiry. The relationship is more often assumed than demonstrated, with conflicting claims about trust repairing or trust wrestling effects. Since most studies focus on single or paired cases, interpretations are highly situated. For example, the flagrant politicisation of lustration in Albania and Poland results in a negative assessment of the measures’ impact, while the extensive lustration in the Czech Republic results in a more positive interpretation. This paper attempts to address this lacuna by providing the first cross-national time series examination of the impact of lustration policies on social trust. Specifically it asks whether lustration improves, undermines, or has no impact on interpersonal trust and trust in social institutions in post-communist countries.

This paper shows that lustration measures have a divergent impact on trust building, both increasing trust in social institutions and decreasing generalised interpersonal trust. First, it finds that lustration improves citizen perceptions of the trustworthiness of social institutions, even controlling for the political, economic, and social context in which the policies are enacted. Second, when lustration is combined with other complementary transitional justice measures, the impact on social trust becomes inconsistent and weaker than the impact of lustration alone. Third, the results are different when the focus is on interpersonal trust. Neither targeted lustration programmes nor more holistic transitional justice measures have a positive impact on interpersonal trust, and might even contribute to the interpersonal distrust that is pervasive in post-communist societies. In sum, the impact of lustration on trust building is neither uniformly positive nor negative, both repairing some and wresting other social ties that bind society.

Trust and lustration

Lustration measures

This paper focuses on lustration, both because of its dominance as a transitional justice mechanism in CEE, and its directly alleged relationship with interpersonal trust building. While lustration is narrowly defined as ‘special public employment laws [to] regulate the process of examining whether a person holding certain higher public positions worked or collaborated with the repressive apparatus of the communist regime’ (David 2003, p. 388), its meaning is substantially broader than employment vetting (Mayer-Rieckh & de Greiff 2007). The term lustration derives from the Latin lustrare, meaning to ‘permit light to come through’ (Zolkos 2006, p. 230), or ‘to purify ceremonially’.3

The implementation of lustration has varied across the post-communist space, sometimes including truth revelation procedures, the publication of information about previous regime involvement, generalised file access, and/or removal of officials from positions of power (Kaminski & Nalepa 2006; Killingsworth 2010, p. 278). Despite its different forms, at its heart there are institutional and symbolic change elements. Institutionally lustration encourages bureaucratic turnover (Sólyom 2003). Symbolically, lustration is designed to

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2Van der Merwe et al. (2009) raise awareness of the discipline’s need for more impact studies. The International Journal of Transitional Justice’s 2010 special issue ‘Transitional Justice on Trial—Evaluating its Impact’ also reflects the turn toward more interest in impact assessments. Olsen et al. (2010) provide one of the first cross-national time series examinations of the impact of transitional justice. However, none of these studies examines the effects of lustration.

purify society of its previous complicity with the communist authoritarian system, and to promote post-communist regime building (Barahona de Brito et al. 2001). Vojtěch Cepl, the author of the Czech constitution and an appointed judge on the Czech Constitutional Court, described lustration as a form of ritual purification to restore the social order and change the ‘moral culture’ of citizens (Cepl 1997, p. 2). From this perspective, lustration is a catalyst for bureaucratic, ideational, and moral societal change.

The impact of lustration has been relatively understudied compared to other types of transitional justice mechanisms (Thoms et al. 2008, p. 37; 2010). Kritz has recently commented:

noncriminal sanctions, such as purges, lustration, and public access to security files, are a critical piece of transitional justice programs and have been featured in one combination or another, in almost every transitional justice case, yet they continue to get short shrift in the research literature. ... They are more important for the democratic reform element and arguably for the peace building element. Research must evaluate how effective these efforts have been. (2009, pp. 19–20)

David’s recent work using experimental vignettes to model the effects of lustration on trust in government is a notable exception (2011). David shows that all lustration programmes have a positive effect on trust in government, and those programmes focusing on dismissals have the biggest impact on trust in government (2011, p. 191). However, he is cautious about the potential effects of lustration on social reconciliation, suggesting a potential for negative effects on social trust (2011, p. 5). Horne (2012) demonstrates that lustration policies have a positive effect on trust in vetted public institutions. Given the dearth of impact assessments and the high stakes implications of assumptions about lustration’s effects, this paper attempts to shed light on the relationship between lustration and social trust building.

Situating lustration in a trust-building narrative

In using the term ‘trust’, this paper starts from Levi and Stoker’s definition of political trust, in which trust ‘involves an individual making herself vulnerable to another individual, group, or institution that has the capacity to do her harm or to betray her’ (2000, p. 476). From this perspective, one decides to trust fellow citizens, or the government or public institutions, after weighing up available information, considering past actions, future interests, and institutional constraints (Hardin 2002; Levi & Stoker 2000). As information about the object of trust changes, assessments of trust also change. There is an inherent element of risk and uncertainty in this decision, hence the need for trust (Warren 1999, p. 1; Tilly 2005, p. 12). Based on this perspective, the types of actions involved in lustration measures—revealing information in secret police files, increasing transparency about the previous regime, changing bureaucratic compositions, punishing offenders, and rewarding good behaviour—could all affect perceptions of the trustworthiness of individuals, institutions, and the government.

Trust levels are especially low in post-communist countries in CEE and the FSU (Mishler & Rose 1995). Low trust levels were reactions to the untrustworthy behaviour of communist governments, and have continued through the present (Kornai & Rose-Ackerman 2004, p. 1). Citizen distrust of the state and fellow countrymen remain legacies of what Havel described
as the ‘post-totalitarian’ system of control in which people must ‘live within a lie’ (emphasis in original) (Killingsworth 2010, pp. 276–77). Mishler and Rose’s analysis of public and civil institutions shows ‘all of the institutions examined suffer substantial levels of public distrust; none enjoy extensive trust; and the average ratio of distrust over trust is approximately 2:1’ (2001, p. 10). Informal understandings and unwritten agreements between current political elites and former elites in positions of power fuelled perceptions that the transitions were unfair, and that the state remains untrustworthy (Wołek 2004). Continued high levels of corruption and economic inequality also contribute to the current environment of low institutional and interpersonal trust (Uslaner 2008).

In particular, widespread complicity with the secret police under communism created an environment of low interpersonal trust. As Rosenberg has described,

> Their complicity was hidden, even from themselves, by the fact that every ordinary citizen behaved the same way. (1995, p. 138)

It is estimated that in East Germany one out of every eight citizens was collaborating or working for the secret police (Moran 1994, p. 98). Secret police collaboration generated 1.35 million files in Romania, which constitutes eight miles of secret police documentation (Mutler 2006). The Czech government estimated that between 1991 and 2001, 402,270 lustration certificates were issued, giving a sense of the magnitude of the files and degree of collaboration (Priban 2007, p. 315). Nalepa demonstrated how fears of widespread complicity by Solidarity members with the secret police affected the post-revolution power sharing structure in Poland (2010). Revelations about the scope and depth of the complicity with the former secret police, as well as the continued advantages conferred by this previous complicity, continue to undermine social trust (Ciobanu 2008; Tupy 2006; Horne 2009).

Moreover, one of the strategies of communist regimes was to create distrust between citizens in order to ensure primary loyalty to the state. Networks of secret police informers intentionally created generalised fear and distrust. The East German *Stasi* practised a policy of *Zersetzung* or decomposition, which meant an active disintegration or subversion of the lives of individuals who would not collaborate. Many argue that the continued high levels of social distrust have undermined the creation of a vibrant civil society and impeded reform efforts (Kornai et al. 2004).

National governments in the post-communist space justified their lustration laws as trust builders and democracy facilitators. Policy makers argued that failing to address past abuses could undermine trust building or worse catalyse new regime distrust, and stymie the transition: ‘The very presence of members of the defined categories [categories of people to be lustrated] may undermine people’s trust in the institutions of the new democratic state, especially in the judiciary, administration and police’ (David 2004, p. 795). An analysis of the lustration law debate in the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly in 1991 demonstrated that trust building was one of the top goals articulated by parliamentary deputies (David 2003, p. 392). A former justice of the Czech Constitutional Court has written that, ‘In the case of

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lustering, the object was to exclude known communists from holding political office because they cannot be trusted to exercise it consistently with democratic principles’ (Cepl 1997, p. 5). Arguments in the Polish Parliament followed this same line of thought: ‘The removal of former agents and collaborators of the security services from important state functions, together with the enactment of legal measures to prevent them from assuming such functions in the future, is a basic requirement of justice and an essential condition for the safe development of democracy in Poland’ (Bertschi 1995, p. 446). Some authors have highlighted the potential for lustering to break cycles of citizen distrust. For example, according to Letki, ‘Breaking the general tendency of distrust towards all aspects of a public sphere demands a purge so that people can see that those steering reforms are not the civil servants who previously acted against the principles of democracy and the free market’ (Letki 2002, p. 541). Framing lustering as a trust-building policy and/or a distrust breaking policy constitutes a way to justify this politically charged and economically costly transitional justice measure.

International actors also claim that transitional justice measures have trust-building properties. The United Nations called employment vetting processes ‘rule of law tools’, designed to ‘(re)establish civic trust and to (re)legitimize public institutions’ (United Nations 2006, pp. 9–11). In discussing efforts to curb corruption and promote trust in government, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights argued that, ‘one of the most effective tools is the use of lustering against public officials found to have been involved in corruption’ (Kiai 2006, p. 5). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe explained,

some states have found it necessary to introduce administrative measures, such as lustering or decommunisation laws. The aim of these measures is to exclude persons from exercising governmental power if they cannot be trusted to exercise it in compliance with democratic principles, as they have shown no commitment to or belief in them in the past and have no interest or motivation to make the transition to them now. (Council of Europe 1996, section 11)

Discourse on lustering and trust often blurs discussions of trust in government, trust in public institutions, and interpersonal or social trust. Lustering is alleged to impact all three objects of trust separately and together. This article focuses on interpersonal trust. Interpersonal trust is generally defined as the propensity of individuals to trust others, as captured by the standard World Values Survey (WVS) question, ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?’. Interpersonal trust is a component of the broader concept of social capital. ‘Social capital has been defined as generalised trust. … The attitudinal aspects of the concept, such as generalised interpersonal trust, are the most important part of social capital’ (Rothstein & Stolle 2008, p. 441). Social institutions refer to public and semi-public institutions that provide opportunities for civic engagement and social networks, such as Putnam’s bowling leagues, unions, and religious institutions (Putnam

5See also the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights’ Case of Bobek v. Poland, 2007 (section 39) and Matyjek v. Poland, 2007 (section 44) (European Court of Human Rights 2007a, 2007b).

6This is question A165 for most waves of the World Values Survey, but is listed as V23 in the most recent fifth wave. It measures the percentage of people who responded that most people can be trusted (World Values Survey 1981–2008).
These institutions create opportunities to build social networks that augment interpersonal trust, from this perspective. As such, this paper focuses on the impact of lustration on generalised interpersonal trust, as well as trust in related social institutions.

**Trust repairing or trust wresting?**

**Lustration debates**

There are competing narratives in the literature regarding the relationship between trust and transitional justice in general, and between trust and lustration more specifically. One side argues that transitional justice measures and lustration policies build trust. In a generalised sense, by addressing wrongdoings in the past, a government can create a strong demarcation between the way things were handled before and the way they will be addressed in the future. This presents an opportunity to break cycles of distrust and catalyse regime renewal. More concretely, different types of transitional justice measures can create trust by enhancing transparency, demonstrating fairness, and/or holding individuals accountable for past actions (Stan 2006). David and Choi categorise three types of transitional justice measures: reparations, which empower victims through financial compensation, truth telling, and social acknowledgment; reconciliation, which rebuilds civic relationships between victims and perpetrators; and retribution, whichpunishes perpetrators of previous abuses in some way such as disallowing their participation in public office (2009, p. 161). Both reparations and reconciliation focus primarily on enhancing transparency and demonstrating fairness, while retribution focuses on holding individuals accountable. As such, these categories of transitional justice measures present complementary but different approaches to trust building.

From the trust-building perspective, transitional justice measures, such as file access, truth telling, and apologies, build trust through the process of increasing transparency and promoting public reconciliation. Truth commissions and apologies demonstrate a commitment to acknowledge past abuses. The process of revealing the truth allegedly functions as a mechanism to build trust in government and public institutions, and by extension fellow citizens. Truth telling is seen as personally empowering to citizens, because it gives them a voice in the process and formally records and therefore validates their experiences. This empowerment facilitates their ability to assess the trustworthiness of both institutions and other citizens and take risks.

Lustration, as a specific form of transitional justice, focuses on building trust through the process of holding individuals accountable for their past behaviour, positions, or affiliations, as well as revealing the truth about previous regime complicity (Fithen 2009). There are both direct and indirect mechanisms by which lustration is alleged to foster interpersonal trust. First, the creation of institutional trust and trust in government is assumed to have an indirect impact on civil society and interpersonal trust. Mayer-Rieckh captures this dynamic when he explains: ‘Vetting processes helps to reestablish civic trust and to relegate public institutions by excluding from them persons who have committed serious abuses in the past and have breached the trust of the citizens they were meant to serve’ (2007, p. 485). Second, there is also a direct interpersonal trust-building component to lustration policies. As the Vice Minister of Interior of the Czech Republic explained,
The network of the StB [secret police] collaborators is like a cancer inside Czechoslovak society. Is it so difficult to understand that people want to know who the former agents and informers are? This is not an issue of vengeance, nor of passing judgments. This is simply a question of trusting our fellow citizens who write newspapers, enact laws and govern our country. (Lós 1995, p. 149)

Increasing transparency about the past is thought to normalise regular activities and build societal trust. In these direct and indirect ways, lustration is theorised to build interpersonal trust.

Lustration functions differently but complementarily with the recognition and reconciliation foci of other transitional justice measures, by including a component of forced institutional or bureaucratic change. Since lustration is often enacted with accompanying transitional justice mechanisms, including truth telling, secret file access, and even trials, it is appropriate to examine it separately and as a component of packages of transitional justice reforms. This reflects the different country approaches to lustration, some more punitive than others and some more focused on truth telling than others. It also reflects differences in trust-building approaches, whether the measures focused primarily on lustration and accountability concerns, or more broadly on accountability combined with societal reconciliation.

In sum, one side of the debate argues that lustration both individually and accompanied by other transitional justice measures has a positive impact on building trust. Even if there are problems with implementation, generally speaking the process of truth telling, individual accountability, bureaucratic change, and retribution can enhance trust. Specifically, lustration with its targeted institutional change component has a theorised trust-building effect on social institutions, and by extension interpersonal trust.

The contending perspectives surrounding lustration and social trust building engender a series of testable hypotheses. Given what we know about the positive relationship between lustration and trust in public institutions, we can test whether there is also a direct relationship between lustration, either alone or as a part of a larger transitional justice reform package, and trust in social institutions.

H1: Lustration increases interpersonal trust and trust in social institutions.
H1a: Lustration combined with other transitional justice mechanisms increases interpersonal trust and trust in social institutions.

There is a strong alternative voice in the literature, concerned that transitional justice could undermine interpersonal trust. Teitel explicates ‘the rule of law dilemma’, or the tension between pursuing justice and cleaving to rule of law practices in a transitional context (2002, p. 12). Bending or suspending rule of law practices early in a post-authoritarian transition could perpetuate distrust of the government and its commitment to democracy. Offe suggests that transitional justice measures ‘may provoke hostile attitudes on the part of those affected or potentially affected by such measures, leading to acts of sabotage, revenge, resentment, and conspiracies on their part. They may even create martyrs, which is even more the case with criminal sanctions applied against key actors of the old regime’ (1992, p. 198).

7See Stan’s 2009 edited volume for a range of lustration and transitional justice programmes across the post-communist space.
Lustration is one type of transitional justice that has been alternately framed as trust undermining. Lustration uses information in secret police files in order to both publically vet political officials and privately provide file access to individuals. Those files contain information documenting how people may have been betrayed by neighbours, friends, co-workers, and even relatives. Revelations about the scope of the interpersonal betrayals could undermine trust.8 There is also a potential to decrease institutional trust, should citizens recoil from current office holders with histories of complicity with the secret police. This is one of the reasons why some prominent dissident voices rejected early calls for lustration and called for a thick line to be drawn between the past and the present (Michnik & Havel 1993): ‘Opponents [of lustration] have feared that the general release of the files would unleash a torrent of mistrust and suspicion thereby undermining the hard work of building a stable democracy’ (Bertschi 1995, p. 448).

Retroactive justice measures, such as lustration, might undermine strict rule of law procedures, thereby undermining the trustworthiness of government and by extension interpersonal trust. Lustration measures that are overtly manipulated by political parties for personal advantage or used as acts of revenge politics, as documented in Hungary, Albania, and Poland, could decrease citizen trust in political parties and government (Kiss 2006; Austin & Ellison 2008; Horne 2009). Problems with the design or the implementation of transitional justice programmes could also create distrust at many levels. Even well designed and well implemented programmes could undermine trust because the nature of the revelations might catalyse renewed fear, retraumatisation, and interpersonal distrust. Hayner’s work on truth commissions has highlighted this double-edged sword of truth telling, by which the process of revealing the truth can retraumatise victims (2001, p. 141).

Finally, Uslaner argues that interpersonal trust is primarily learned from one’s parents, and is not impacted in the short term by civic engagement levels (2002, p. 26). Generalised dispositions to trust are learned early in life and are durable, although not immutable. From this perspective, one would not expect short term transitional justice measures, such as lustration or truth telling, to have an impact on interpersonal trust levels. In sum, the assumption that interpersonal trust building, or any change in trust at all, will result from well intentioned lustration and transitional justice measures is problematic. A positive relationship between lustration and social trust cannot be assumed. Based on the existing trust literature, lustration alone or enacted with other transitional justice reforms could have no impact on interpersonal trust or worse could undermine interpersonal trust. These hypotheses will be tested later in the empirical analysis.

H2: Lustration measures decrease interpersonal trust and trust in social institutions.
H2a: Lustration measures as part of packages of transitional justice measures decrease interpersonal trust and trust in social institutions.
H2b: Lustration has no impact on interpersonal trust.

Direct or indirect trust-building mechanisms

If there is a relationship between lustration and social trust, is it a direct or a mediated relationship? If lustration improves or undermines interpersonal trust, it might be because it

8Author’s conversation with János Kornai at Collegium Budapest, Hungary, 14 October 2002.
is affecting the trustworthiness of government and/or public institutions, which in turn affect interpersonal trust. Several previously discussed causal mechanisms highlight this indirect effect. Controlling for levels of institutional trust might obviate any direct relationship between social trust building and lustration.

There is conflicting evidence regarding the relationship between institutional and interpersonal trust. Rose-Ackerman argues that the causal relationship could go in either direction, citing cases with low interpersonal trust but high institutional trust and other cases with high institutional trust but low interpersonal trust (2001, p. 421). Uslaner is more emphatic, using trust data to show that institutional trust and interpersonal trust do not move together in post-communist countries (2008, p. 153; 2002, pp. 7–8). However, Rothstein and Eek used a series of human subject experiments to model a direct relationship between trust in authorities and social trust. They demonstrated this in both high and low-trusting countries, such as Sweden and Romania (Rothstein & Eek 2009, p. 106). Due to empirical disagreements in the literature, this paper will not presuppose directionality between institutional and interpersonal trust in post-communist countries. Controlling for institutional trust, both of national government and public institutions, will present a challenging test of the impact on social trust of lustration. When factoring in institutional trust, it is possible that lustration has no direct impact on social trust. We know from the trust literature that social trust is related to political trust, although there is no consensus on the causal directions. To take this relationship into account, this paper will control for the possible effects of political trust, such as trust in public institutions and trust in government, on social trust. This allows us to more precisely examine if there is a relationship between transitional justice and trust by including the most likely alternative explanations.

**H3:** Controlling for levels of trust in government, there will be a direct relationship between lustration and social trust.

**H3a:** Controlling for levels of trust in public institutions, there will be a direct relationship between lustration and social trust.

**Aggregate-level factors**

Many political, economic, and social variables could also influence social trust. This article controls for economic change, level of democracy, corruption levels, and change in inequality, to try to ascertain any impact lustration and transitional justice measures might have separate from the aggregate social, political, and economic changes in CEE and the FSU. For example, economic growth and prosperity could drive citizens’ perceptions of interpersonal trust, improving when their material conditions improved. Or, more expansive democracy could systematically affect citizen perceptions of trust, irrespective of transitional justice measures. Corruption has been shown to have a negative impact on trust (Uslaner 2008). It is likely that the more corrupt a country and its public institutions are perceived to be, the less trusting citizens will be of those institutions and each other.

Additionally, the literature cites a possible impact of inequality on social trust (Rothstein & Uslaner 2005). There has been a well documented increase in economic inequality across the post-communist region since 1989 (Paczynska 2005). Uslaner argues that the level of economic equality in a country has a powerful effect on the level of interpersonal trust (2008, p. 65), with high inequality decreasing trust. Mishler and Rose find less evidence to
support these assertions in CEE: ‘fairness considerations are less important than freedom considerations in affecting citizens’ perception of trust in institutions’ (Mishler & Rose 1995, p. 24). This paper will test the possibility that rising economic inequality in the post-communist space is adversely impacting on social trust. All of the aforementioned aggregate economic, social, and political context variables could obviate any perceptible impact of lustration on trust building. The literature on inequality suggests material considerations may be so overwhelmingly important to citizens that they drive social trust propensities. Therefore, we test for the possible importance of inequality as an alternative explanation of changes in social trust.

H4: Rising economic inequality undermines social trust.

In sum, the hypotheses reflect assumptions in the literature about the impact of lustration on trust building. Both proponents and opponents of lustration are motivated by their beliefs about which approach will support democratisation (Zolkos 2006). Therefore, discerning which approach contributes to or undermines trust carries substantial policy implications. If trust is not enhanced through lustration, then some of the justifications for policies that are materially costly and emotionally divisive might be re-examined. If lustration enhances trust, then countries might be encouraged to start the difficult task of accounting for their past. If, however, lustration has a mixed impact, the difficult task of weighing trade-offs must be included in any policy choices.

Data and methods

Countries

This article focuses on 13 countries in the post-communist space that have either opted for or rejected lustration policies or transitional justice programmes as part of their post-authoritarian transitions. These comprise Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. Table 1 lists the countries in the study and categorises them according to their approaches to lustration. (Not all countries appear in all regressions due to data limitations, and this is noted for each analysis. The study focuses on post-authoritarian transitions only.)

Lustration measures

The coding of lustration and transitional justice measures is highly controversial, reflecting the country specific nature of programme assessments, and the problems placing specific programmes within a broader comparative context. Therefore, to test possible effects of lustration on interpersonal trust, lustration has been coded in three ways. First, a dummy variable captures the presence or absence of lustration policies. This dummy variable tests whether the enactment of even minimal lustration has an important symbolic impact, irrespective of actual implementation. It also avoids possible disagreement over interpreting the degree of implementation of lustration. A second more nuanced coding of lustration focuses on both the laws and their actual implementation. This variable assesses the scope, size, intensity, and actual implementation of programmes across the region. As with the
## TABLE 1

CODING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSTRATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lustration rejected (0)</th>
<th>Laws passed but no real implementation (1)</th>
<th>Partially lustrated (2)</th>
<th>Lustrated (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• absence of both formal laws and debate about lustration</td>
<td>• although the laws were passed, there was no real implementation</td>
<td>• laws are both legally passed and partially implemented</td>
<td>• lustration laws were passed and implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• avenues for transitional justice were politically and legally closed</td>
<td>• no compulsory removal of officials from public positions</td>
<td>• some bureaucratic change as a result of laws</td>
<td>• a wide scope of positions were screened across a range of public and semi-public positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• secret police files remain sealed, with limited access</td>
<td>• minimal bureaucratic change</td>
<td>• the politicisation of measures compromises the impact and scope of lustration</td>
<td>• real bureaucratic change as a result of lustration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Belarus, Russia, Ukraine  
Albania, Bulgaria  
Poland, Romania, Slovakia  
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary

**Notes:** See Appendix 2 for case details.  
The categories (0, 1, 2, 3) represent measures of 'lustration implementation'. They present a range of ordinal measures of lustration across the post-communist space from a rejection of lustration (0) to more expansive lustration (3).
previous lustration measure, it conceptualises lustration as a retributive measure. This measure takes into account the possible politicisation of the programmes, if the programmes actually removed officials from public office, and if the laws resulted in the intended bureaucratic change. As such, this coding helps to capture the impact that manipulation by political parties might have on the effects of the laws on trust building. These two approaches are reflected in Table 1 which indicates which countries qualify as lustrated (3), partially lustrated (2), de facto not lustrated despite laws in place (1), and no lustration laws or practice (0).

Then, in a third approach, lustration measures are coded as packages of reforms grouped with other related transitional justice measures, including access to secret archives and court proceedings. This coding tests whether lustration combined with other transitional justice measures is more efficacious at building interpersonal trust than lustration alone. Stan’s 2009 coding is used because her edited volume includes a variety of country experts’ voices, and reflects a cross-national consensus regarding the scope and intensity of transitional justice measures across the post-communist space. As Table 2 shows, post-communist countries are grouped into four categories, depending on the scope and intensity of their lustration programmes and the extent to which secret archive access and court proceedings were also included as complementary transitional justice measures (Stan 2009, p. 248). I have included a category (0) for no transitional justice programme. Category one countries have lustration laws but have problems implementing them. By comparison, category zero countries have refused to debate, enact, and implement transitional justice.

The three lustration variables embody different mechanisms theorised to impact on trust. The presence or absence of lustration tests a possible symbolic impact of lustration policies, not conditioned on any institutional change component. The lustration implementation variable captures lustration as a primarily retributive measure. Lustration combined with other transitional justice measures encapsulates a mixture of retribution, reconciliation, accountability, and reparation. This approach allows for the testing of how different types of transitional justice approaches might operate through different causal mechanisms. All of these measures are highly correlated, reflecting the underlying similarity in their logic and derivation. Despite these high correlations, this paper will show substantial difference in the significance of the variables across the models, suggesting that retributive measures and reconciliation measures impact trust differently.

Social trust measures

The primary dependent variable is social trust. This project uses two different measures of social trust: interpersonal trust and trust in social institutions. First, I use direct interpersonal trust measures available from the WVS covering 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. There are two different methods of operationalising this interpersonal trust variable. First, the standard WVS number measures the percentage of people who say that ‘most people can be trusted’. Second, the WVS suggests constructing a trust index by taking the difference of the percentage of people who say ‘most people can be trusted’ from people who say ‘you can’t
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No transitional justice (0)</th>
<th>Attempts at transitional justice resisted (1)</th>
<th>Weak transitional justice (2)</th>
<th>Mild transitional justice (3)</th>
<th>Vigorous and quick transitional justice (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• no transitional justice or attempts to address the past</td>
<td>• attempts to re-evaluate the past were resisted</td>
<td>• weak approaches to transitional justice</td>
<td>• transitional justice was either less radical in scope or delayed</td>
<td>• strong approaches to transitional justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• no court trials or file access</td>
<td>• lustration laws were passed</td>
<td>• Romania had early court proceedings and late file access, but no lustration</td>
<td>• Bulgaria had early lustration, late file access and no court trials</td>
<td>• these approaches involved lustration, access to secret archives and court proceedings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• no lustration laws</td>
<td>• the measures followed a ‘forgive and forget approach’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Russia
Ukraine
Belarus

Albania
Slovakia

Bulgaria
Romania

Hungary
Poland

Czech Republic
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia

Note: These categories are drawn from Stan (2009, p. 262), in which she spells out an ordinal ranking of categories of transitional justice ranging from no measures to extensive measures. See Stan (2009) for extensive country details and supporting information.
be too careful’ in order to better capture the interpersonal trust dynamic (Medrano 2010).\textsuperscript{10} Both the raw WVS interpersonal trust measure and the constructed WVS trust index are used in this analysis. The sample size is small because of the infrequency of the survey and the aggregated nature of the data.

Given the data limitations of the direct interpersonal trust measures, a second more indirect method of measuring social trust is also employed, namely trust in social institutions. While trust in social institutions is not synonymous with interpersonal trust, social institutions provide a complementary forum for building social networks and social capital. The exact relationship between civic associations and social trust is contested, with studies at the aggregate level confirming these findings and other more micro-level examinations finding no such correlations (Rothstein & Eek 2009, p. 87). Because this study employs aggregate-level data, and because a strong correlation has been demonstrated repeatedly between civil society, civic participation, and social trust at the aggregate level, I employ trust in social institutions as another way of triangulating the concept of social trust. This increases the size of the dataset and allows for the testing of theoretical insights from the civil society and social trust literature.

Putnam breaks civic participation into three categories: community-based, church-based, and work-based (2000, p. 49). A similar approach is used here, in which a composite of trust in religious institutions, unions, and the media is constructed to capture an array of social institutions with opportunities for civic engagement. These institutions have all been included in lustration debates or actual laws. Not all post-communist countries have vetted each or all institutions. However, even the inclusion of certain institutions in the lustration debate can have an effect, catalysing public consideration of those institutions, or prompting individuals to leave positions or not attempt to take positions for fear that they could be vetted in the future. For example, in 2007 the Archbishop of Warsaw was publically vetted over collaboration revelations, despite the fact that Poland rejected the formal lustration of the church (Smith 2007).\textsuperscript{11}

Trust in social institutions is measured as an average of the aggregate of citizen trust in these three different social institutions using Eurobarometer and the New Democracies Barometer (NDB) Surveys of Central and Eastern Europe and states in the Former Soviet Union trust data (European Commission 2001–2009; Rose et al. 1994, 1996; Rose 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2002a, 2002b, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009; Rose & Haerpfer 1996, 1998). The Eurobarometer figures do not include former FSU countries in the sample and are only available from 2001 to 2009. The NDB surveys include FSU countries, and cover the period 1993–2008, but data are sporadic and incomplete.\textsuperscript{12} Therefore, merging the two data sources results in coverage of more of the post-communist region and expands the time period under analysis. All the available data on the measures are averaged to produce a

\textsuperscript{10}It is represented by the formula: trust index = \(100 + \% \text{ of most people can be trusted} - (\text{minus}) \% \text{ of can’t be too careful.}

\textsuperscript{11}The possible vetting of the clergy in Poland has been the subject of controversy. It is estimated that one tenth of the clergy were secret police informers: ‘Poland and the Past: Tainted Vestments’, The Economist, 13 January 2007, p. 47. The church’s collaboration with the secret police under communism is a well known secret, but what remains unclear is what widespread revelations would mean to the myth of Polish Catholicism both as an opposition force under Communism, and as a moral compass for the present (Ascherson 2007). Poland has rejected calls for the inclusion of the clergy under the lustration laws.

\textsuperscript{12}Note: the NDB data are not available from the authors, so the data used were compiled from all the NDB surveys that are publicly available.
merged average measure of trust in social institutions that covers all the countries in the sample and increases the size of the dataset. The averaging produces a single data point that minimises the possible distortion of any single institution or measure on the overall concept of social trust. The time period tested is 1998–2009, with trust in social institutions as the dependent variable. This represents the most complete dataset possible given available data (see Appendix 1 for calculations).

There is a lag between the start of lustration in the region and the data on trust in social institutions. This lag should not dilute the significance of lustration, if there is one, for two reasons. First, many of the policies remain in effect, or have been expanded, elongated, and re instituted through 2009. Only some of the early lustration policies expired, such as the Hungarian case. The Czech Republic, which had the first lustration programme in 1991, still had on-going lustration in 2010, and Poland and Romania passed new lustration laws in 2006. Second, transitional justice measures are supposed to have a lingering institutional and symbolic impact on countries. Countries that enacted lustration, or file access, or truth-telling measures early in their transitions should experience continued impact over time. Therefore, a data lag between the start of lustration and data on trust should not have an impact on assessments of trust building over a decade.

**Trust in public institutions and government**

Trust in public institutions and trust in government are conceptually distinct and measured differently. Conceptually, trust in public institutions is narrowly and directly linked to individual institutions, such as the judiciary and parliament. By comparison, trust in government captures the assessment by citizens of the credibility, fairness, transparency, compliance, and in some cases, effectiveness, of the government across social, political, and economic issue areas. In this sense it is less particularised or focused on a specific issue or public office (Braithwaite & Levi 1998, p. 54).

Both variables are operationalised as the percentage of citizens who responded in surveys that they trust in either the national government or a specific institution. The measurement technique for both is similar, but the object of trust is different. This study uses both Eurobarometer and NDB public opinion surveys as measures of trust in public institutions and trust in national government. These two data sources are combined to construct an aggregated data point for each country-year and each variable, and the merged number reflects an average of all of the available measures. For this study, only public institutions that were directly and consistently targeted for vetting were used: political parties, the parliament, and the judiciary (see Appendix 1).

Finally, there are four control variables included in this study: economic change, level of democracy, corruption, and change in inequality. To measure economic change, International Monetary Fund figures are used to calculate change in GDP _per capita_ and change in GDP, using conventional two year lagged variables (International Monetary Fund 1991–2009). Freedom House democracy scores are used to measure level of democracy (Freedom House 1997–2009). Transparency International’s ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’ is used to measure corruption (Transparency International 1997–2009). To measure change in inequality, two and three year lagged figures are drawn from the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) GINI coefficient measures (UNU-WIDER...
1990–2009). It is the change in inequality that is theorised to impact people’s perceptions of
government and trust rather than the absolute level of inequality.
While this study does not directly examine how the possible politicisation or
instrumentalisation of lustration affects trust, there are several indirect ways in which the
domestic political context is factored into this analysis. The nuanced measure of lustration
captures any overt manipulation of the laws that might taint their impact (see Table 1). Trust
in national government, trust in public institutions, levels of democracy, and perceptions of
corruption incorporate citizen perceptions of the fairness and accountability of government
policies and the system in general. Finally, the cross-national, time series nature of the study
minimises the effect of any single example of the manipulation of transitional justice,
although it cannot obviate that possibility. Future analyses might consider analysing more
directly the impact of politicisation of transitional justice on its overall efficacy.

Data analysis
An originally constructed dataset was compiled to include the aforementioned variables and
controls. The dataset covers 13 countries over the period 1991–2009, with a maximum
possible of 228 country-year observations, although incomplete data renders a maximum of
no more than 96 country-year observations for most models. Because of this structure I
employ time series cross-sectional analysis, clustered by country. Sample size and time
period are noted for each of the three analyses.

Does interpersonal trust vary?
A first order question is whether interpersonal trust varies. Looking at WVS measures of
interpersonal trust from 1990 to 2005, there is substantial variation in the region. Lithuania’s

![Interpersonal Trust Index — World Values Survey](image_url)
interpersonal trust measure declined by 19%, the Czech Republic’s declined by 20%, Bulgaria’s declined by 22%, Russia’s decreased by 30%, Slovakia’s declined by 32%, and Poland’s decreased by 35%. This suggests a substantial change in interpersonal trust measures over the post-transition time period.

Using the WVS trust index alternative measure, Figure 1 demonstrates substantial variation in interpersonal trust across the region and within countries, although no clear patterns emerge. Trust in Bulgaria consistently declined, while trust in Russia plummeted and then started to rise, and trust in Romania both rose and fell. Uslaner argues that interpersonal trust is static, and should not be impacted by changes in information or the immediate economic and political environment (2002, p. 26); however these figures do not support that assertion. This is important because if interpersonal trust levels were static, they would not be affected by the changes in information, transparency, or accountability catalysed by lustration policies. By demonstrating variation in levels of interpersonal trust, both within countries and between countries, initial conditions are met to test what, if any, impact lustration and other transitional justice measures might have on levels of interpersonal trust.

Testing the impact of lustration on interpersonal trust

Turning to the impact of lustration on interpersonal trust, Table 3 shows the results of a series of general OLS regression analyses clustered by country, with interpersonal trust as the dependent variable. Because the sample is small, only an economic control variable is included in the preliminary models; the inclusion of other controls cuts the sample size in half. Two different measures of interpersonal trust as the dependent variable are used: standard WVS interpersonal trust data and the WVS trust index.

For both the WVS interpersonal trust measure and the WVS trust index measure, the presence or absence of lustration (Model 1a), measures of the implementation of lustration (Model 1b), and lustration measures combined with other transitional justice policies (Model 1c) are all statistically significant except in the opposite direction hypothesised. Countries with more lustration and more transitional justice have lower levels of interpersonal trust. In Model 1a, the lustration dummy accounts for nearly 25% of the variation in interpersonal trust, and is highly significant. By comparison, the other operationalisations of lustration account for only 12–13% of the variation in interpersonal trust. Lustration alone and lustration packaged with other measures has a clear negative relationship with interpersonal trust.

Economic controls are incorporated into Models 1d–1f, however economic growth is not a significant predictor of interpersonal trust, and does not impact the robustness of the lustration dummy (Model 1d). Even with economic change controls, lustration continues to explain 26% of the variation in lower levels of trust. In Model 1e, the implementation of lustration variable is significant at the $p = 0.07$ level, using a two-tailed $t$-test. When lustration packaged with other transitional justice measures is tested (Model 1f), the sample
size drops by 15% and this lustration measure is no longer a robust predictor of interpersonal trust. In all the models that include economic controls, lustration measures are negatively signed, suggesting a negative relationship with interpersonal trust.

The preliminary findings suggest that lustration is correlated with declining interpersonal trust or, depending on the model, has no relationship with trust. These findings refute hypotheses H1 and H2, and cautiously corroborate the assertions of the critics of transitional justice who have worried that lustration measures, file access, and the public dissemination of information about secret police collaboration could undermine interpersonal trust. It is possible that as citizens get more information about the extent of the previous regime’s duplicity and citizen complicity with that regime, there could be a decrease in interpersonal trust. The widespread regime complicity in post-communist countries means that even people who were passively compliant could be called ‘complicit’ (Michnik & Havel 1993, p. 21). This potentially widens the scope of people who might feel guilty or be impacted through a truth revelation process, thereby generalising the distrust. The ability to generalise from these models is constrained by their small sample size and the limited inclusion of control variables. Therefore, the next section turns to trust in social institutions as the dependent variable in order to introduce more national-level control variables and augment the explanatory power of the models.

**Lustration and trust in social institutions**

Table 4 lists the results of a series of cross-sectional time-series feasible general least squares regression analyses with trust in social institutions as the dependent variable. The

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**TABLE 3**

**EFFECTS OF LUSTRATION ON INTERPERSONAL TRUST** *1991–2009*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1a</th>
<th>Model 1b</th>
<th>Model 1c</th>
<th>Model 1d</th>
<th>Model 1e</th>
<th>Model 1f</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence/absence lustration</td>
<td>$-4.07^{**}$ (2.76)</td>
<td>$-2.86^{**}$ (0.62)</td>
<td>$-2.54^*$ (1.01)</td>
<td>$-1.95^\dagger$ (1.88)</td>
<td>$0.81$ (0.02)</td>
<td>$1.42$ (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lustration implementation</td>
<td>$-3.25^{**}$ (1.68)</td>
<td>$-1.79$ (1.53)</td>
<td>$\text{(not significant)}$</td>
<td>$\text{(not significant)}$</td>
<td>$0.81$ (0.02)</td>
<td>$1.42$ (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lustration combined with other transitional justice measures</td>
<td>$2.54^*$ (1.01)</td>
<td>$1.79$ (1.53)</td>
<td>$\text{(not significant)}$</td>
<td>$\text{(not significant)}$</td>
<td>$0.81$ (0.02)</td>
<td>$1.42$ (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change GDP/capita</td>
<td>$0.81$ (0.02)</td>
<td>$1.42$ (0.06)</td>
<td>$1.89$ (0.07)</td>
<td>$1.42$ (0.06)</td>
<td>$0.81$ (0.02)</td>
<td>$1.42$ (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$-value</td>
<td>16.55</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R$-squared</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** $^*$ $p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$, two tailed $t$-test.

$^\dagger$ Note, significance at $p = 0.07$ level, so drops out if using 0.05 as threshold.

General Least Squares regression results reported, clustered by country code.

$T$ values and robust standard errors reported. Constant terms estimated but not reported.

$^\dagger$ Two measures of interpersonal trust are presented: the WVS trust measure and the WVS trust index measure. Both measures are detailed in Appendix 1. Both are from the same source (see Medrano 2010).

$^*$ Note, WVS trust and WVS trust index results were the same, therefore only one is reported.
### TABLE 4

**Effects of Lustration on Trust in Social Institutions, 1998–2009 (aggregate of trust in the media, religious institutions and unions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2a</th>
<th>Model 2b</th>
<th>Model 2c</th>
<th>Model 2d</th>
<th>Model 2e</th>
<th>Model 2f</th>
<th>Model 2g</th>
<th>Model 2h</th>
<th>Model 2i</th>
<th>Model 2j</th>
<th>Model 2k</th>
<th>Model 2l</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lustration</td>
<td>(2.72)</td>
<td>(2.89)</td>
<td>(2.44)</td>
<td>(2.62)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lustration implementation</td>
<td>– –</td>
<td>3.35***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3.54***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2.80**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3.02**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in public institutions</td>
<td>– –</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in national government</td>
<td>– –</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage change GDP/capita (2 year lagged)</td>
<td>2.90**</td>
<td>3.43***</td>
<td>3.59***</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>3.33***</td>
<td>3.64***</td>
<td>3.77***</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>2.25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratisation</td>
<td>–4.62***</td>
<td>–1.80</td>
<td>–0.52</td>
<td>–5.96***</td>
<td>–1.72</td>
<td>–0.23</td>
<td>–3.80***</td>
<td>–1.29</td>
<td>–0.12</td>
<td>–5.21***</td>
<td>–1.21</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>–0.79</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>2.44*</td>
<td>2.26*</td>
<td>2.45*</td>
<td>2.28*</td>
<td>2.65**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage change inequality (3 year lagged)</td>
<td>– – –</td>
<td>–0.87</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Cross-sectional time series FGLS regressions. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001, two tailed t-test.

1 Twelve country-code clustered panels.
2 Eleven country-code clustered panels.
3 Both two and three year lagged change in inequality measures yield similar models. Three year lagged figures are reported.
data are clustered by country, and the period under investigation is 1998–2009. Due to incomplete data on trust in national government, half of the models have 12 country panels and half of the models have 11 country panels.

Controlling for trust in public institutions

Models 2a, 2b and 2c test the impact of each of the three lustration measures on trust in social institutions. Albania drops out due to lack of data. The lustration dummy (Model 2a) and lustration implementation variable (Model 2b) are both positively signed and significant predictors of trust in social institutions, even controlling for trust in public institutions. This means that more lustration is positively and directly associated with more trust in social institutions. However, lustration packaged with other transitional justice measures (Model 2c) is not a significant predictor of trust in social institutions. Predicted value calculations capture the magnitude of the impact of lustration on changes in trust in social institutions. A shift from no lustration (0) to a lustration programme (1) increases trust in social institutions by 20%. Using the more nuanced lustration implementation variable, a shift from ‘no de facto lustration’ (category 1) to ‘partially lustrated’ (category 2) increases trust in social institutions by 5.7%, yielding an overall increase in trust of 23%, if lustration is fully implemented (category 4). The predicted value calculations demonstrate that lustration has a large magnitude of effect on trust in social institutions.

The control variables do not substantially change the impact of lustration on trust in social institutions. Trust in public institutions is not a consistent predictor of more social trust. It is only significant in Model 2c, when the packaged lustration variable is included in the model. This pattern will hold across the models, with trust in institutions dropping out in models when lustration alone is included and re-emerging in models when lustration is combined with other measures. This suggests there is an impact of institutional trust on social trust, but that this impact is not consistent or direct. Of the controls, only economic growth is consistently significant. As either GDP per capita increases or GDP increases, there are higher levels of trust in social institutions. However, corruption is not significant in any of these models, and democracy is also not a consistent predictor of trust in social institutions, with lower levels of democracy associated with higher levels of trust in Model 2a.

With respect to hypothesis H3, these findings suggest that lustration has an independent effect on trust in social institutions, not simply a mediated effect through changes in trust in public institutions. When lustration is packaged with other transitional justice measures, it has less of an impact on social trust, and drops out of significance in the model. This suggests that retributive justice measures like lustration alone, which require institutional change, have a greater trust impact than transitional justice measures that include a combination of reconciliation, reparation, and retributive policies.

15Change in GDP was dropped because it yields the same results as change in GDP per capita but reduces the overall sample size.
Controlling for trust in government

Models 2g, 2h, and 2i mirror the aforementioned models, except they include trust in government as a control. Similar to the previous models, lustration programmes (2 g) and lustration implementation (2h) are significant predictors of trust in social institutions, but lustration packaged with other transitional justice measures is not (2i). Using predicted value calculations to determine the magnitude of the effect of the lustration dummy, a shift from ‘no lustration’ (0) to ‘lustration’ (1) increases trust in social institutions by 17%. Using the alternative measure of lustration’s implementation, a shift from ‘partial lustration’ (3) to ‘full lustration’ (4) increases trust by 4.3%. Even controlling for the impact of trust in government, lustration programmes have a strong positive effect on trust in social institutions.

Trust in government is not a significant predictor of trust in social institutions when lustration is included in the models. However, when lustration packaged with other transitional justice measures is included, trust in national government becomes significant. As with the previous institutional trust measure, this suggests there is an impact of trust in government on social trust, but that this impact is not strong or consistent. Also similar to the other models, improvements in economic conditions are positive predictors of trust in social institutions, while corruption and democracy are not consistently robust factors. With respect to hypothesis H3, these results suggest that lustration can have a direct impact on trust in social institutions, not simply one mediated by changes in trust in government.

Inequality and trust

An increase in inequality is theorised to negatively impact interpersonal trust. Models 2d–2f and 2j–2l test this, using three year lagged change variables. In none of the models was inequality ever significant. With respect to hypothesis H4, there is no evidence that changes in inequality affect trust in social institutions. Moreover, none of the controls had a consistent and robust impact on trust in social institutions. Neither trust in government nor trust in public institutions nor democracy nor corruption is consistently significant in these models. Economic change is also not a significant predictor of social trust with these model specifications.

Critically, lustration measures (2e and 2k) and the lustration dummy (2d and 2j) remain significant predictors of trust in all the models. The inclusion of inequality and trust in government or trust in public institutions does not affect the statistical significance of either operationalisation of lustration. As with the previous models, when lustration is packaged with other transitional justice measures, its significance is less consistent. It remains significant in the model including trust in public institutions (2f) but is no longer significant when controlling for trust in government (2l).

16Trust in government and trust in public institutions are highly correlated ($r = 0.77, N = 107$), so they cannot be included in the same models due to autocorrelation problems. Albania and Russia both drop out due to lack of data.

17One, two, and three year lagged change variables were tried with similar results. Three year lagged change measures are reported here because this resulted in the largest sample size, and provided the maximal possibility to detect an inequality effect.

18Since the correlation between change in inequality and change in GDP is low, there is no reason to assume autocorrelation or remove either from the model ($r = 0.04, N = 140$).
Using predicted value estimations, lustration programmes increase trust in social institutions by 26% (Model 2d). Controlling for trust in government and inequality (Model 2j), there is a 21% increase in trust in social institutions when a country shifts from ‘no lustration’ (0) to a ‘lustration’ programme (1). Using the alternate measure of lustration implementation, for each one category shift in lustration there is a 7.4% change in trust in social institutions when controlling for trust in public institutions (Model 2e), and a 5.6% shift in social trust when controlling for trust in government (Model 2j). That means that each time there is a shift to a more extensive level of lustration with more real implementation, even controlling for trust in public institutions or trust in government, there is an increase of between 5.6% and 7.4% in perceptions of the trustworthiness of social institutions. By comparison, a one category shift in lustration packaged with other measures yields a 1.4% change in trust, with a cumulated impact of only 5.8% across all the levels. Lustration programmes alone have five times the impact of the more holistic transitional justice programmes in which lustration is only one element.

In sum, lustration, both a simple dichotomous representation of it and a more nuanced measure of its scope and implementation, is a consistently significant predictor of trust in social institutions. Packages of transitional justice measures not only have a less consistent impact on changing perceptions of the trustworthiness of social institutions, but also the magnitude of the effect is dramatically smaller. The different magnitude of effect predictions suggests that not all transitional justice measures have the same impact on trust building, with the targeted lustration programmes having the larger and more consistently positive impact on trust levels.

Conclusion

This article provides the first cross-sectional, time series evaluation of the impact of transitional justice in general, and lustration in particular on social trust. The preliminary evidence is mixed. First, this study finds no direct positive impact of either targeted lustration policies or lustration packaged with more comprehensive transitional justice measures on generalised interpersonal trust. If anything, the findings suggest that the vetting of public officials, the truth-telling exercises, and the file access might make citizens less trusting of each other. Lustration and other transitional justice measures do not improve interpersonal trust, and might undermine it.

Second, the paper provides strong evidence for the efficacy of lustration measures on building trust in social institutions. More extensive lustration programmes were associated with more trust in religious, community, and work-based civil society institutions. Even controlling for national-level factors, such as improvements in economic conditions, increased democracy, changes in inequality, and levels of corruption, lustration was a significant predictor of more trust in social institutions. The impact of lustration combined with other transitional justice measures was less consistent and weaker than the effects of lustration alone. This suggests that there could be significant differences in the trust-building mechanisms and propensities between retributive and reconciliation type approaches to transitional justice. The transitional justice measures focused on truth telling, file access, and transparency as means of dealing with the past might be less efficacious than bureaucratic or institutional change measures at changing perceptions of trustworthiness.
Third, lustration has a direct impact on trust in civil society oriented social institutions. The literature has debated whether trust in social institutions is only indirectly impacted by lustration as a result of changes in trust in government or trust in vetted public institutions. This study finds that lustration has a direct effect on social institutions, although it does not rule out other complementary indirect or recursive trust effects from related public institutions. These preliminary results could be refined if future studies were to include more national-level control variables, in order to tease out how different domestic political contexts and institutions impact the efficacy of lustration and other transitional justice measures.

In sum, the findings from this paper suggest that lustration measures in general, and transitional justice measures conditionally, can improve trust in targeted social institutions, but cannot improve more generalised interpersonal trust. In fact, the process of reckoning with the past might actually decrease interpersonal trust, as the scope and intensity of previous regime abuses and citizen complicity come to light. As such, lustration appears to both repair and undermine social trust-building mechanisms, thereby raising complex policy trade-offs for future transitional justice programmes. These findings beg the question: what is the relationship between interpersonal trust and trust in social institutions in the process of democratic consolidation? Addressing this question would further our understanding of the role of trust building and democratic consolidation in post-communist countries.

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### Appendix 1. Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Specification and transformation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transitional Justice Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lustration laws</td>
<td>Presence or absence of lustration laws</td>
<td>0/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(author compiled)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lustration implementation</td>
<td>Assessment of enactment and implementation of lustration</td>
<td>0–3, from no implementation to full implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(author compiled)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lustration combined with other transitional justice measures (access to secret archives and court proceedings)</td>
<td>Stan (2009)</td>
<td>0–4, from no transitional justice through to quick and vigorous transitional justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interpersonal Trust Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal trust</td>
<td>World Values Survey</td>
<td>% trust most people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal trust index</td>
<td>World Values Survey</td>
<td>100 + % trust most people − % can’t be too careful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust social institutions</td>
<td>Eurobarometer and New Democracies Barometer (NDB) data combined</td>
<td>Average % trust religious institutions, unions, and the press each country-year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trust in each institution averaged for each country-year, to yield one data point reflecting the average of the three institutions across the two data sources. Given incomplete data, this results in averaging between four and six measures from the two data sources combined for each country-year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional Trust Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in government</td>
<td>Eurobarometer and NDB combined</td>
<td>Average of scores, square root transformed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in public institutions</td>
<td>Eurobarometer and NDB combined</td>
<td>Average of % trust in judiciary, parliament, and political parties—log transform. Trust in each institution averaged for each country-year, to yield one data point reflecting the average of the three institutions across the two data sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>Two year lagged, change GDP per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>Two year lagged, square root, change GDP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Concept | Source | Specification and transformation
--- | --- | ---
Democracy Corruption | Freedom House Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index | Inverse, squared Inverse, squared
Inequality | WIDER: World Income Inequality | Change inequality, one, two, and three year lagged

Notes: 0 = no transitional justice; 1 = resisted attempts at transitional justice; 2 = weak transitional justice; 3 = mild transitional justice; 4 = quick and vigorous transitional justice.

Appendix 2. Categorising Lustration Implementation across the Post-Communist Region

Category 0—Reject lustration: neither de jure laws nor de facto implementation
- This group of countries actively rejected lustration as a way to address communist legacies.
- There is both an absence of formal laws and an absence of debate about transitional justice.
- The avenues for revisiting any form of transitional justice have been closed politically and/or legally.
- The secret police files remain sealed, limiting public access to information about the past.

Examples:
Belarus—No lustration proposals or transitional justice measures were enacted. All efforts to address the past were thwarted.
Russia—Parliament made lustration a criminal offence in 1991. A lustration bill was proposed in 1992, but set aside by parliament. No public identification of KGB collaborations to date. General file access has been denied, but limited official access is possible since 1991.
Ukraine—After the Orange Revolution in 2005, two lustration bills were proposed but then rejected by the President and Parliament. The secret police archives remain closed. In 2005 a purge of the political opposition was not linked to lustration. No concerted effort to evaluate the communist past through transitional justice.

Category 1—Passed lustration laws but no de facto implementation
- Lustration laws were legally passed at different times in the transition, but there was a lack of real implementation.
- There has been no removal of officials from positions as a result of lustration.
- Non-political positions were targeted for lustration to avoid tackling the key political positions. This minimised real bureaucratic change.

Examples:
Albania—While several lustration related laws were passed in 1995 and 1998, there was no real implementation of the laws.
Bulgaria—Several lustration related laws passed in 1992, 1997 and 2002, but there was minimal lustration in practice. The existing laws focused on academics and scientific institutions not the political elites.

Category 2—Partially lustrated: Passed and implemented laws
- Laws are both legally passed and implemented, albeit sometimes incompletely or partially.
- Lustration took place but problems with implementation or limitations on the scope affected their impact.
- There are false starts and stops to lustration programmes, resulting in politicised and stalled proceedings.
- Constitutional courts have blocked the implementation of some or all parts of the measures.
- New rounds of expanded lustration have been enacted late in the transition with popular support.

(continued)
Examples:

**Poland**—The laws were regularly caught in cycles of political manipulation (1989, 1992, 1997, 2006), resulting in multiple starts and stops to lustration policies. There was limited early implementation of the laws, but an expansive round of late lustration was launched in 2006. Multiple Constitutional Court rulings blocked implementation of the laws. There was limited early implementation of the laws, but an expansive round of late lustration was launched in 2006. Multiple Constitutional Court rulings blocked implementation of the laws. There remains continued support for vetting.

**Romania**—Despite much lustration debate there has been little agreement on the laws, with many symbolic public disclosures but little lustration in practice. In 2006 an expansive lustration programme to enact ‘real’ lustration started but the Constitutional Court blocked the laws in 2008. There is continued citizen support for transitional justice.

**Slovakia**—The 1991 Czechoslovak lustration law expired without implementation. No lustration in practice until 2004 when renewed interest led to the first public access to the files. Some lustration through public disclosure started, but not strongly supported by government. Popular support for policies continues.

**Category 3—Full lustration programme: More expansive laws and implementation**

- Lustration laws were passed and implemented, with a wide scope and consistent implementation.
- The laws included the screening of individuals in public and/or private sector positions.
- There has been actual removal of individuals from positions, amounting to forced bureaucratic change elements.
- Citizen fatigue set in and most programmes are concluded.

Examples:

**Czech Republic**—The broadest and longest lasting programme in the region. A significant number of files were reviewed and individuals vetted. Police vetting expanded lustration in 2007, along with increased file transparency. The process of active lustration is largely over.

**Hungary**—An early but limited lustration programme, narrowly focused on the president and the parliament, although the laws were originally conceived as much broader. There was some removal of individuals from public office and public truth telling about the past, but lustration formally concluded.

**Estonia**—Citizenship criteria were used as vetting tools starting in 1995, resulting in the removal of individuals from positions and offices. A complementary 1995 lustration law targeted parliament and president.

**Latvia**—Lustration and citizenship laws passed in 1994 and 1995, involving a mixture of anti-Russian policies and lustration. The laws actively vetted individuals from local and national elections, and removed people from public sector positions.

**Lithuania**—Several lustration laws passed (1991, 1999) covering both public and private sector employment vetting. Individuals both removed and prevented from taking positions.