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What is This?

Assessing the Impact of Lustration on Trust in Public Institutions and National Government in Central and Eastern Europe

Cynthia M. Horne[1]

Abstract

Lustration is alternately theorized and anecdotally alleged to either undermine or contribute to the democratic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) by supporting or undermining trust in public institutions, and by extension trust in national government. Using quantitative data on nine countries in CEE, this study examines the impact of lustration and transitional justice measures on citizen perceptions of the trustworthiness of public institutions and national government. It tests whether and how the timing of lustration, the severity of lustration, or the packaging of lustration with other forms of transitional justice affect trust in public institutions and national government. This article finds that even when controlling for economic growth, democratization, and corruption levels, lustration consistently and positively contributes to citizen trust in public institutions. However, lustration and transitional justice measures have an indirect and diluted impact on trust in national government, when they have any impact at all.

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Lustration is one of the regionally dominant transitional justice measures opted for by almost all countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as part of their post-communist political and economic transitions. Lustration is a specialized form of employment vetting and is narrowly defined as "special public employment laws [to] regulate the process of examining whether a person holding certain higher public positions worked or collaborated with the repressive apparatus of the communist regime" (David, 2003, p. 388; Letki, 2002, p. 530). Stan (2009) defines lustration as "the banning of communist officials and secret political police officers and informers from post-communist politics and positions of influence in society" (p. 11).1 In some countries the consequences of this collaboration or involvement could entail removal from office or position, whereas in other cases only lying about the nature of that collaboration or involvement is grounds for removal (Nedelsky, 2009; Williams, Szczerbiak, & Fowler, 2003). Lustration is thought to have both a symbolic and an institutional component: symbolically signaling a break with the past and bureaucratically changing the composition of public institutions and the government (United Nations, 2006).

National governments in CEE claim they are enacting lustration policies to improve citizen perceptions of the trustworthiness of post-communist public institutions and government (David, 2003; Horne, 2009b). Regional governments argue that past injustices need to be corrected to move forward with the process of democratic consolidation (United Nations, 2006). This conflicts sharply with the contention by critics that the problems associated with both the letter and implementation of lustration threaten to undermine the process of democratic consolidation. In addition to the potential violations of rule of law principles, critics also argue that the laws tend to get caught in cycles of political manipulation (Horne & Levi, 2004). The legal uncertainty and potential moral problems with lustration policies could decrease citizen trust in public institutions and by extension national government.

Despite strong and conflicting views of lustration's effects on trust, there is little systematic work on the actual impact of lustration policies on the trustworthiness of public institutions across the region. The dominant questions in the lustration debate have focused on why countries have adopted certain types of lustration policies or if the policies are complete, not on assessing the effects of those policies. This is understandable given that there

was insufficient time after lustration to judge relative impact across the region. This essay aims to address this gap and to explore the effects of lustration policies on institutional trustworthiness and trust in national government across countries in CEE between 2001 and 2009.2

To test if lustration affects trust, this article both introduces a measure of lustration and uses several authors' established assessments of lustration. Given the contested interpretations of lustration programs, using multiple established measures serves as a way to triangulate the problem of determining what is an authentically implemented and/or complete lustration program. Even with varied assessments of lustration, the findings show that lustration policies do positively and consistently improve citizen trust in public institutions. However, lustration and transitional justice measures have a much more inconsistent and at times diluted impact on trust in national government.

Lustration Debate

Whether to Lustrate or Not

"The dominant view in the academic literature is that transitional justice is counterproductive because it interferes with the development of democratic institutions and market economies" (Posner & Vermeule, 2004, p. 825). Drawing on the critiques of lustration, I outline three broad reasons why lustration is perceived to undermine trust in public institutions. First, the manner in which lustration laws potentially or actively violate individual rights, liberties, and legal guarantees has been cited in the arguments against the laws (Sólyom, 2003). Some of the legal compromises associated with lustration include charges of retroactive justice, due process violations, and selectivity biases. Retroactive justice, including trying someone for a crime now when it was not a crime at the time it was committed, shows disregard for "procedural legality" or adherence to letter of the law and therefore violates rule of law concerns (Posner & Vermeule, 2004, p. 792). Potential due process violations are cited as another reason why lustration could violate rule of law procedures (Boed, 1999). There is a danger of selectivity, by which some but not all perpetrators of past abuse are punished, thereby creating a sense of biased justice (Minow, 1998, p. 31). Some critics of vetting have argued that these types of omissions could undermine the trustworthiness of the resulting public institutions and by extension the national government.

Second, even if the laws were constitutional and necessary, some argue the implementation is so problematic as to undermine the trustworthiness of the

institutions that are lustrated. Lustration uses information from the secret police files, which are notoriously incomplete, of questionable veracity, and morally suspect. The information problems and transparency issues associated with lustration could undermine the legality of the outcomes (Michnik & Havel, 1993; Varga, 1997).

Third, the danger of political manipulation of lustration policies could undermine the goal of good governance. Political parties have been shown to use lustration against their political opponents to remove them from positions of power or to discredit individuals or their party in the eyes of the public (Austin & Ellison, 2008; Kiss, 2006). The potential for blackmail is great, as there could be differential access to information that could be used to black-mail politicians or people in positions of power later in their political careers (Kaminski & Nalepa, 2006). If citizens perceive lustration policies to be little more than tools of party politics, this perception could undermine citizen assessments of the trustworthiness of public institutions.

There are an equal number of compelling reasons why vetting is cited by CEE governments as a critical component of their democratic transitions and an important part of the process of building trustworthy public institutions. First, vetting is framed as vital for state security (Williams, 2003). Untrustworthy public officials must be removed from positions of trust lest they undermine the transition. For example, skills learned in a centrally planned communist system might be ill suited to further market-oriented democratic reforms. Moreover, vetting establishes a bureaucratic break with the past, something that might be important in negotiated settlements with little visible power transfers (Huntington, 1991; Welsh, 1996).

Second, if bureaucrats, secret police informers, and political apparatchiki were to remain in their positions, they would be able to take advantage of the privileges they carried over from the previous regime (David, 2003, p. 398). Popular resentment toward officials who remain in positions of power or public perceptions that secret police networks and networks of former *nomenklatura* continue to enjoy economic and political privileges in the new system threaten to undermine citizen trust in public institutions (Grigorescu, 2006; Tupy, 2006).

Third, there is a symbolic or moral component to lustration. Governments have stressed the "moral cleansing" aspect of their lustration policies (Horne, 2009b; Stan, 2006). The symbolic element of lustration was explicitly included in the Council of Europe's 1996 resolution "On Measures to Dismantle the Heritage of Former Communist Totalitarian System." The council stressed the utility of lustration and vetting in the process by which "old structures and

thought patterns have to be dismantled and overcome" (Council of Europe, 1996). Lustration addresses the politics of memory concerns associated with post-communist regime building (de Brito, Gonzalez-Enriquez, & Aguilar, 2001). Therefore, there is an alleged positive ideational effect on trust.

Lustration is not assumed to be neutral; there are hypothesized positive and negative effects. These competing claims about the impact of lustration suggest the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis$_1$: Lustration programs improve the trustworthiness of pubic institutions.

Hypothesis$_{1a}$: Lustration programs undermine the trustworthiness of pubic institutions.

Hypothesis$_2$: Lustration programs improve the trustworthiness of national governments.

Hypothesis$_{2a}$: Lustration programs undermine the trustworthiness of national governments.

When to Lustrate: Timing

Straddling the two sides of the lustration debate is a second order question focused not on *whether* lustration but *when* lustration (Simonovic, 2004). It has been argued that lustration must take place early in the transition, lest it get distorted or corrupted from its original intention of effecting symbolic and institutional change (Ackerman, 1992). Lustration measures have been described by the European Court of Human Rights and the Council of Europe as acceptable rule of law compromises during periods of extraordinary politics, such as soon after a regime transition (Horne, 2009a). However, once the period of extraordinary circumstances has passed, the appropriateness and utility of late lustration has been questioned (Sólyom, 2003, p. 141). Even more strongly, it has been argued that if lustration comes too late in the process, it could get caught in cycles of political manipulation and undermine rather than build trust.

Others have argued that the focus on timing has minimized the cognitive as well as organizational importance of exposing collaborators and removing them from political life. As Posner argues, "[T]hey did not see that these people could do harm and that their presence in positions of power would demoralize the public, who would then, in turn, demand their removal (Posner & Vermeule, 2004, p. 808). From this perspective, timing was less important than policy implementation (Cioflâncă, 2002). If it were shown that lustration

might be useful only at the start of the transition, this would foreclose lustration as a current viable possibility for transitional justice in CEE. This debate suggests two more hypotheses:

> *Hypothesis$_3$*: Late lustration programs will undermine citizen perceptions of trust in public institutions and/or national government.
>
> *Hypothesis$_{3a}$*: The timing of lustration does not affect the utility of lustration on trust building.

How to Lustrate: Severity of Punishment

In addition to questions regarding the timing of lustration, a third order question is how to lustrate. This question involves the design of lustration programs, such as the optimal size, scope, duration, and severity of lustration programs. Some scholars have focused on the effectiveness of different lustration sanctioning mechanisms. Kaminski and Nalepa (2006) assessed lustration programs according to the harshness or mildness of the punishment. The rationale is that the severity or mildness of the punishment can affect the efficacy of the programs. There are mixed predictions on directionality, with some arguing that harsh programs are better at restoring institutional trust and others arguing that the more symbolic focus of mild programs is better for the creation of trust.

> *Hypothesis$_4$*: The severity of the lustration program affects its effectiveness at creating institutional trustworthiness or trust in national government.
>
> *Hypothesis$_{4a}$*: Harsh lustration programs are better at restoring trust than are mild programs.

Lustration as Part of a Package of Transitional Justice Measures

Finally, some argue that lustration should be contextualized within the various related transitional justice measures adopted by each country. CEE has pursued a mixture of transitional justice measures, including truth and reconciliation style commissions, court trials and amnesties, purges and screenings, financial compensation and property restitution, promoting transparency through file access, and truth telling as acts of cleansing and forgiveness. Lustration programs work in conjunction with other transitional justice

measures. Therefore, to understand their impact, one must contextualize them within a country's broader transitional justice efforts.

> *Hypothesis$_5$*: More extensive transitional justice programs, which include but are not limited to lustration, will have a positive impact on institutional trust and/or trust in national government.

In sum, there are a series of cleavages in the literature: whether to lustrate, when to lustrate, and how to lustrate. The aforementioned directional hypotheses can be tested to evaluate the competing claims about lustration's impact on trust in public institutions and trust in national governments in CEE. In the next section, I turn to variable specification and operationalization issues to set up a means of testing these hypotheses.

Variable Operationalization

Countries

The analyses focus on lustration programs in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Albania is excluded from the statistical analyses because of the lack of consistent data on citizen trust. All of the countries have enacted some type of lustration policies. Estonia and Latvia used a combination of citizenship laws and election laws as a means of vetting public employment positions and leadership positions. These laws have mirrored the structure and function of lustration and have been directly compared to and considered lustration policies by others (Stan, 2009, pp. 249-250). I use a similar understanding here. Table 1 lists the countries in the study with the dates and details of their first lustration laws.

Independent Variables: Measuring Lustration

Initial lustration program assessments: Letki's measures. Letki takes a holistic approach to assessing the completeness of lustration. She categorized countries according to overall assessments of their lustration programs through 1999: sufficiently lustrated (2), insufficiently lustrated (1), and no real lustration (0; Letki, 2002, pp. 543-549). Three factors were used in rendering the assessments: the actual implementation of the lustration program, not simply if laws had been enacted; the practicality of the scope of the program, namely

Table 1. Timing of Lustration

Country (year of regime transition)	Year lustration enacted	Lustration policy[a]
Albania (1990)	1995	Law Nr. 8001, dated 22 September 1995, "On Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity Committed in Albania During the Communist Regime for Political, Ideological and Religious Reasons"
		Law Nr. 8043, dated 30 November 1995, "On the Control of the Moral Figure of Officials and Other Persons Connected with the Protection of the Democratic State" (Ballauri & Imholz, 2005)
Bulgaria (1989)	1992	Law on Banks and Credit Activity, No. 25 of March 18, 1992
		Law for Temporary Introduction of Some Additional Requirements for the Members of the Executive Bodies of Scientific Organizations and the Higher Certifying Commission ("Panev Law"), December 9, 1992 (Kritz, 1993a, 1993b)
Czech Republic (1989)	1991	Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Screening ("Lustration") Law, Act No. 451/1991, October 4, 1991 (Kritz, 1993c; Nedelsky, 2009)
Estonia (1991)	1995	Law on Citizenship, Adopted by the Riigikogu on 19 January 1995 Proclaimed as Law by the President of Estonia, 31 January 1995
Hungary (1989)	1994	Law on Background Checks To Be Conducted on Individuals Holding Certain Important Positions, Law No. 23, March 8, 1994 (Kritz, 1993d)
Latvia (1991)	1994	The Citizenship Law, 1994
		The Parliamentary Elections Act (*Saeimas v l šanu likums*) of 25 May 1995 (*Case of Ždanoka v. Latvia*, 2006; Stan, 2009, p. 234)
Lithuania (1991)	1991	Lithuania: Decree Banning KGB Employees and Informers from Government Positions, Decree No. 418, October 12, 1991
		Law on the Verification of Mandates of Those Deputies Accused of Consciously Collaborating With Special Services of Other States, Law No. I-2115, December 17, 1991 (Kritz, 1993e, 1993f)

(continued)

Table 1. (continued)

Country (year of regime transition)	Year lustration enacted	Lustration policy[a]
Poland (1989)	1997	The Lustration Act. 11 April 1997, Law on Disclosing Work for or Service in the State's Security Services or Collaboration With Them Between 1944 and 1990 by Persons Exercising Public Functions (*ustawa o ujawnieniu pracy lub służby w organach bezpieczeństwa państwa lub współpracy z nimi w latach 1944–1990 osób pełniących funkcje publiczne*) (European Court of Human Rights, 2008; Polish Constitutional Tribunal, 2007)
Romania (1989)	1999	"Ticu Dumitrescu Law" (Law no. 187/December 9, 1999), created Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (CNSAS) to oversee secret police files and control public access to information; CNSAS issuing symbolic rulings (Cioflâncă, 2002)
Slovakia (1989)	2002	Act of August 19, 2002, on Disclosure of Documents Regarding the Activity of State Security Authorities in the Period 1939–1989 and on Founding the Nation's Memory Institute (Ústav pamäti národa) and on Amending Certain Acts (Nation's Memory Act), 553/2002, Government of Slovakia, Coll., http://www.upn.gov.sk/data/pdf/553_2002_en.pdf
		Nb: Although the 1991 Czech and Slovak Lustration Act technically applied to Slovakia, it was unimplemented and expired (Kritz, 1993c)

The dates for the end of the old regime reflect either the year of the "Velvet Revolution," the break up of the Soviet Union, or the break down of the communist monopoly on power (Brown, 1991; Zielonka, 2001).
a. Earliest policy, not any subsequent policies or changes. Includes access to files, employment vetting, and/or citizenship restrictions

if it was designed for real change; and the impartiality of the program, if it was designed as a tool against the political opposition (see Table 2).

Current program assessment: Multiple lustration measures. Lustration implementation and programs have changed since Letki's initial work, which ended assessments in 1999. Earlier coding missed subsequent lustration laws and programs and failed to include the citizenship laws in the Baltics as forms of lustration. This article introduces an updated lustration measure based on a

Table 2. Initial Lustration Assessments (Letki, 2002)

Sufficiently lustrated (2)	Insufficiently lustrated (1)	Non-lustrated (de facto; 0)
Germany	Bulgaria	Estonia
Czech Republic	Slovakia	Latvia
Hungary	Albania	Romania
Poland		Ukraine
		Belarus

similarly holistic assessment of lustration programs. It combines multiple lustration measures such as assessments of the scope, size, intensity, and actual implementation of programs. Table 3 outlines some of the conditions that would need to be met to qualify as sufficiently lustrated (2), insufficiently lustrated (1), or de facto not lustrated (0). I have used this multiple lustration measure to capture the actual implementation of the programs, the politicization of the programs, whether the programs actually remove officials from public office or are mostly symbolic, if the laws capture only top-level officials or more levels of governance, if the lustration laws avoid top officials and focus on more symbolic positions (academics), if the laws include public and private sector positions, if the laws have been blocked by constitutional court rulings, and if there is citizen fatigue with the laws resulting in their conclusion. Table 3 presents the criteria, derived from the transitional justice literature, used to classify countries through 2008.

Timing. I measure timing relative to the start of each country's transition. Table 1 lists the date of each country's transition from communism in column 1, the date of their first lustration policy in column 2, and an explanation of the specific lustration policy in column 3. Timing is recorded as the difference between the year of the first lustration policy and the earliest possible start of a lustration program, meaning the year of regime change.[3] The literature suggests a linear relationship between timing and efficacy, with later programs being less efficacious than earlier programs. This article tests this assumption of linearity, by including variables for the timing of lustration and the square of timing, to test for the possible presence of a nonlinear relationship between timing and efficacy.

These dates are also used as reference points to code a dummy variable, the presence or absence of lustration. This variable is included in all the models as a control. Since lustration measures are assumed to have continued symbolic and institutional impact even when they expire, once lustration is enacted it is coded as 1 for the duration of the study.

Table 3. Multiple Lustration Measures

Sufficiently Lustrated(2)	Insufficiently Lustrated(1)	Non-lustrated (de facto)(0)
• Lustration laws implemented • Some screening of individuals (either public or private sector or both) • Some removal from office or positions • Citizen fatigue-symbolically done with process	• Failure to implement laws on the books • False starts and stops to lustration • Lustration stalled for political reasons • Constitutional Court blocks implementation but does not rule lustration process unconstitutional • New rounds of expanded lustration demonstrate population not done with measures	• Laws in place but no real implementation • No removal from office • Targeting non-political positions and office holders
Czech Republic--most widespread and longest lasting program in region; police vetting expanded (2007) along with increased file transparency; however program of active lustration largely ended at this point.	**Poland**—multiple starts and stops to lustration; caught in cycles of political manipulation (1989, 1992, 1997, 2006); limited implementation in practice; expansive round of lustration launched 2006; multiple Constitutional Court rulings blocking implementation; continued popular calls for vetting.	**Albania**—several lustration related laws passed (1995, 1998), but no real implementation; no *de facto* lustration.
Hungary—early but limited lustration; narrowly focused on president and the parliament in practice although laws were broader; some removal from public office and public truth telling; citizen fatigue with lustration concluded use of laws.	**Romania**—much lustration debate but no agreement on laws; symbolic rulings by CNSAS but little lustration in practice; 2006 expansive lustration program to enact "real" lustration; Constitutional Court blockage of laws 2008; continued citizen support for laws.	**Bulgaria**—several lustration related laws (1992, 1997, 2002), but minimal lustration; focus on academics and scientific institutions; no real lustration of political elites.

(continued)

Table 3. (continued)

Sufficiently Lustrated(2)	Insufficiently Lustrated(1)	Non-lustrated (de facto)(0)
Estonia—citizenship criteria used as vetting tool (1995); removal of individuals from positions and office; 1995 lustration law targeted parliament and president.	**Slovakia**—1991 Czechoslovak lustration law expired without implementation; no lustration until 2004 when interest renewed; files published 2004 and lustration started; popular support for policies.	
Latvia—lustration and citizenship laws (1994, 1995); mixture of anti-Russian policies and lustration; actively vetted individuals from local and national elections; vetting for public sector positions.		
Lithuania—several lustration laws passed (1991, 1999); both public and private sector employment vetting; individuals both removed and prevented from taking positions.		

–modification of Letki's categories using updated 2008 data

Sanctioning mechanisms: Harsh or lenient. Kaminski and Nalepa (2006) present an alternative classification rubric focused on the severity of lustration. Their study coded type of punishment in lustration programs, juxtaposing harsh or lenient lustration. If extensive employment vetting took place with severe sanctioning for past regime involvement, the authors called this "harsh." If the lustration program focused on truth-telling exercises and punishment only in the event of lying about the lustration process, this was considered "mild." Only countries actually classified by Kaminski and Nalepa are used in the coding of their variables to ensure valid treatment of their approach, resulting in a smaller overall sample size (see Table 4).

Table 4. Severity of Lustration (Kaminski & Nalepa, 2006)

Harsh lustration (2)	Mild lustration (1)	No lustration (0)
• Lustrated individuals must prove they did not commit targeted activity	• Truth telling	• No lustration measures legally enacted
• Removal from office	• Information release	
• More severe sanctioning—not just publicizing info	• Sanctioning tends to be release of compromising information	
Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Estonia	Hungary, Poland	These countries received a 0 for the period before they legally enacted laws
		Only countries covered in the article are used— their coding was not extrapolated on other cases

See Kaminiski and Nalepa (2006, appendix, p. 405) for explanation of categories. The transition dates provided by K & N are used in this coding to remain consistent with their analysis.

Multiple transitional justice measures. A final way to operationalize lustration is to consider it as part of a package of transitional justice measures adopted in CEE, including lustration policies, access to secret archives, and vigorous and quick court proceedings. Stan (2009) argues that "Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics can be divided into four main clusters, based on the severity and timing of their efforts to reckon with the past" (p. 262). She develops a scale along the three transitional justice criteria. This scale can be used to test whether more comprehensive transitional justice measures, with lustration as a primary but not exclusive component, have a greater impact on building trust. Table 5 outlines Stan's categories in descending order in terms of "the severity and timing" of efforts, from "vigorous and quick" (4), to "mild transitional justice" (3), to "weak transitional justice" (2), to "resisted attempts at transitional justice" (1; Stan, 2009, p. 248). Since Stan argues that "transitional justice rebuilds trust among citizens and between citizens and the state" (3), it is reasonable to assert that her scaling of country groupings can be used to test if there is a perceptible impact on trust in public institutions and trust in government.

There are substantial differences between the ways scholars have operationalized lustration programs and measures. For example, Letki's lustration

Table 5. Categories of Transitional Justice (Stan, 2009)

"Vigorous and quick" (4)	"Mild transitional justice" (3)	"Weak transitional justice" (2)	"Resisted attempts at transitional justice" (1)
Czech Republic	Hungary	Bulgaria	Albania
Latvia	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
Lithuania			
Estonia			

These categories are direct quotes and represent Stan's own composite of three types of transitional justice (lustration, access to secret archives, and court proceedings; Stan, 2009, p. 248).

assessment measure is weakly correlated with Stan's transitional justice measures (Pearson's $r = .02$ to .11, depending on the sample size).[4] Letki's measure of lustration is more strongly correlated with Kaminski and Nalepa's assessment of the severity of lustration programs ($r = .62$). Stan's assessment of transitional justice is moderately correlated with Kaminski and Nalepa's measure of severity ($r = .54$). The new measure of lustration offered here has a higher correlation with Stan's assessment of transitional justice ($r = .81$ to .89) but is weakly correlated with Letki's measure on which it is based ($r = .02$ to .22). Because of the potential for multicollinearity, only one lustration measure is tested in each model. I include timing in all models because of the weak collinearity with the measures of lustration and transitional justice.

The variation in measures of lustration or transitional justice across this group of countries demonstrates the lack of consensus in the literature regarding how to assess lustration. As previously discussed, there is no single definition of lustration and no single way of measuring each of the components. Different emphasis has been placed on the scope, duration, severity, and implementation of lustration in CEE, resulting in different assessments of the lustration programs. Although there is obvious overlap in some operationalizations of lustration, there remain multiple interpretations of ways to measure the severity or impact of lustration as a form of transitional justice in CEE. As such, this piece is using multiple authors' measures of lustration in the hopes of triangulating the question of whether lustration affects trust.

Dependent Variables: Institutional Trustworthiness and Trust in National Government

I employ Eurobarometer public opinion surveys as measures of trust in public institutions and trust in national government to test lustration's effects

(European Commission, 2001–2009). Eurobarometer trust measures are available only from 2001 to 2008, and through 2009 in the case of trust in national government. This project uses all available trust data. Measures of trustworthiness were available for highly politicized public institutions (political parties and the parliament), public rule of law institutions (the judiciary, the army, and the police), and public civil-society-related institutions (the press and unions). The data capture the percentage of citizens who responded that they trusted the aforementioned types of public institutions. There is substantial variation in institutional trust assessments both within and between countries.

Eurobarometer trust in public institutions and trust in national government data were used to construct three different dependent variables. In Model 1, the dependent variable is trust in the public institutions that were directly targeted in lustration laws and employment-vetting policies, namely the judiciary, the police, the army, parliament, and political parties. This dependent variable uses an average of the aggregate of citizen trust in each of these institutions. Model 1 includes a mixture of highly politicized and less overtly politicized public institutions.[5]

Model 2 focuses on less politicized public institutions. This dependent variable is an average of the aggregate of trust in the judiciary, the police, the army, and the press. By excluding political parties, this model captures the more commonly understood meaning of public institutions.

Model 3 uses trust in national government as the dependent variable. Trust in national government is treated separately from trust in public institutions. Trust in government is a multivariable composite, capturing a holistic assessment by citizens of the credibility, fairness, transparency, compliance, and, in some cases, effectiveness of the government across social, political, and economic issue areas (Braithwaite & Levi, 1998; Kornai & Ackerman, 2004). Discussions of trust building and government tend to focus on improvements in government legitimacy as a result of transitional justice measures. As Robert Putnam's (1993) work has emphasized, building trustworthy government through transitional justice is an indirect process, focused on the social capital creating nature of trust. Stan (2009) echoes this understanding of the relationship between trust in national government and transitional justice when she explains,

> Transitional justice rebuilds trust among citizens and between citizens and the state, and in doing so allows the community and the state to come together and solve the problems of the nation. Trust, in its turn, leads to the accumulation of rich social capital reserves, the formation of vibrant voluntary associations, and the rebirth of a strong civil society able to hold the state accountable for its actions. (p. 3)

These accounts of the expected impact of transitional justice on trust in national government depict an indirect rather than a direct effect. This is because vetting targets specific public institutions, not the whole national government. The national government might be affected by lustration efforts to the extent that lustration vets the public institutions that constitute the national government writ large. As such, one would expect to see the greatest impact of any of the lustration measures on directly targeted public institutions and, by extension, a lesser impact if any on national government. In addition, assessments of the trustworthiness of national government are not simply a function of the capabilities of the institutions of government. Citizen assessments of the trustworthiness of government are also affected by government performance in economic, social, and political spheres. As such, one should expect only an indirect and partial impact of lustration on trust in national government. Model 3 tests the impact of lustration and transitional justice on trust in national government.

Control Variables: Economic Change, Democracy, and Corruption

There are three control variables included in this study: economic change, level of democratization, and corruption levels. It is possible that citizen perceptions of institutional trustworthiness could largely be driven by economic development or economic success. In terms of measurement, this would mean when gross domestic product (GDP) or GDP per capita is rising, citizens could translate this material well-being into improved perceptions of the trustworthiness of government and/or certain public institutions. It is also possible that the more society operates on rule of law principles and the more citizens enjoy personal liberties and freedoms associated with democracy, especially in the context of post-communist transitions, the more citizens will register trust in public institutions. Therefore, more expansive democracy could systematically affect citizen perceptions of institutional trustworthiness. Finally, corruption could have an impact on institutional trustworthiness. It is likely that the more corrupt a country and its public institutions are perceived to be, the less trusting citizens will be of those institutions. Although it is not possible theoretically or empirically to truly isolate the impact of lustration on trust building, introducing controls for economic growth, democracy, and level of corruption improves the explanatory power and theoretical accuracy of the models.

Two different measures of economic change are used to minimize the possibility that the results could be sensitive to a single variable's measurement.

International Monetary Fund figures are used to calculate both change in GDP per capita and change in GDP (International Monetary Fund, 1991–2009). Two-year-lagged variables are used to see if material economic changes at either the individual level or the country level affect citizen perceptions of institutions. Transparency International's (1997–2009) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and Heritage Foundation's freedom from corruption measures are used, to have two different measures of corruption (Heritage Foundation, 1995–2009).6 Freedom House democracy scores are used to measure level of democracy (Freedom House, 1997–2009). Different combinations of the three main control variables are used in the models to minimize interaction effects and to ascertain if results are consistent across different variable operationalizations.

Results

I estimated a series of cross-sectional time series feasible generalized least squares regressions on the aforementioned variables with each of the three possible dependent variables.7 Each of the lustration variables is run separately to avoid multicollinearity problems. Predicted values at the 95% confidence interval were computed for the lustration variables to determine the magnitude of effect of lustration measures on trust in public institutions and national government.

Model 1: Dependent Variable: Trust in Directly Targeted Public Institutions

In Models 1a–1b, the dependent variable is the trustworthiness of directly targeted public institutions: the judiciary, the police, the army, parliament, and political parties. (See Table 6). All of the models demonstrate that transitional justice measures and multiple lustration measures are associated with more trust in public institutions.8 Predicted value calculations indicate that a shift from no lustration to limited lustration (*multiple measures* = 1) increased the trust in institutions by 1.6% to 2%. A shift from no lustration to a more comprehensive lustration program (*multiple lustration* = 2) increased trust in institutions by 3.26% to 4%. In contrast, a shift between each level of Stan's transitional justice assessment (from 1 to 2 or from 2 to 3) increased trust by 0.59%. This means that vigorous and quick transitional justice (Category 4) countries had a 0.59% increase in trust as compared to mild transitional justice countries (Category 3). When comparing countries that resisted transitional justice measures to countries that adopted more comprehensive transitional

Table 6. Effects of Lustration on Trust in Directly Targeted Public Institutions (2001–2008)

Models DV: Composite of trust in judiciary, police, army, parliament, and political parties (avg)

	Model 1a[1]	Model 1b[1]	Model 1c[1]	Model 1d	Model 1e
square root % change GDP	−.0004	—	—	—	.08
(two year lagged)	(.03)				(.06)
% change GDP/capita	—	.002	−.0006	.003	—
(two year lagged)		(.001)	(.002)	(.002)	
sq inverse Dem freedom	−0.02***	−.02***	−.005	0.008	.008
(Freedom house)	(.005)	(.004)	(.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Freedom from Corruption	.02***	.01***	—	—	.01*
(Heritage foundation)	(.003)	(.002)			(.005)
square inverse corruption	—	—	−.01***	−.01***	—
(CPI, Transparency Intl)			(.002)	(.003)	
Timing lustration	.10***	.11***	.10***	.19***	.20***
(time since regime change)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.04)	(.05)
Timing lustration squared	−.003**	−.006***	−.006***	−.02***	−.02***
	(0.001)	(.001)	(.002)	(.004)	(.005)
Presence/ absence lustration	.23	−.26	−.34	3.2***	dropped
(dummy control)	(.29)	(.24)	(.30)	(.23)	collinearity

(continued)

Table 6. (continued)

Models DV: Composite of trust in judiciary, police, army, parliament, and political parties (avg)

	Model 1a[1]	Model 1b[1]	Model 1c[1]	Model 1d	Model 1e
Letki lustration measures	—	—	−.02	—	—
			(.02)		
Harsh/lenient (Kaminski and Nalepa measure)	—	—	—	.06* (.03)	.08** (.03)
Transitional just measures (Stan's three TJ factors)	.13*** (.03)	—	—	—	—
Multiple Measures Lustration	—	.14*** (.03)	—	—	—
Sample Size	69	72	64	48	46
Log likelihood	46.1	51.73	35.62	32.02	29.37

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001, two-tailed t-test.

Cross sectional time series Feasible General Least Squares regression results reported, clustered by country code. Constant terms estimated but not reported.

[1]All permutations of the independent variables run with this lustration variable specification yield similar results, so only one is reported here.

justice measures (the full range of categories), one predicts an increase in trust of between 1.74% and 2.13%. As such, lustration alone appears to have a more substantial effect on trust building in targeted public institutions than a more diverse array of transitional justice measures.

Models 1d–1e test Kaminski and Nalepa's severity of lustration measure. The severity of the lustration programs was directly and positively associated with more trust in public institutions. Using predicted value calculations, a shift from no lustration to lenient lustration improved trust in institutions by 1%, and a shift from no lustration to harsh lustration increased trust by approximately 2%. Although the result is mild, it is significant and robust across the models. Model 1c tests the effects of Letki's early classification of lustration programs. Her specification for lustration was not significant in any of the models. However, the multiple measures update of Letki was always

Figure 1. Cross-National Measures of Democratization
Source: Freedom House, *Nations in Transit*, Various years. *http://wwsw.freedomhouse.org/template
.cfm?page=17*

significant (see 1b), suggesting problems with her classification of lustration ending in 1999.

Across the models the timing of lustration is always significant and robust. However, the findings suggest timing does not present a simple linear relationship with trust. Timing is positively signed and robust, and timing squared is negatively signed and robust in all the models. This suggests a non-linear relationship between the timing of lustration and trust building. More specifically, it suggests that timing can be represented as a modified inverted *U* shape, with lustration's trust effects rising over time and then reaching a critical tipping point, after which they decline.9 This is an important finding since it suggests two things. First, there is not a simple negative relationship between time and trust. Second, it suggests that slightly delayed lustration might be more efficacious than lustration immediately post-transition, although the exact optimal timing is unknown in the models.

The level of democracy is often significant but not always. When it is significant it is in a negative direction, meaning less democracy is associated with more trust. There is substantial variation in level of democracy both within and between countries over this time period, so lack of variation does

Table 7. Effects of Lustration on Trust in Directly Targeted but Less Politicized Public Institutions (2001–2008)

Models DV: Composite of trust in judiciary, police, press, army (aggregated avg)

	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c[1]	Model 2d	Model 2e	Model 2f	Model 2g
square root % change GDP	—	.005	.01	−.008	—	.03	—
(two year lagged)		(.02)	(.03)	(.04)		(.04)	
% change GDP/ capita	.001	—	—	—	.002	—	.003*
(two year lagged)	(.0009)				(.001)		(.001)
sq inverse Dem freedom	−.01***	−.02***	−.01**	.0005	3.61e-06	.002	−.0008
(Freedom house)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.006)
Freedom from Corruption	—	.009***	—	—	.006***	—	.01***
(Heritage foundation)		(.002)			(.002)		(.003)
square inverse corruption	−.007***	—	−.005***	−.006**	—	−.01***	—
(CPI, Transparency Intl)	(.001)		(.002)	(.002)		(.003)	
Timing lustration	.06***	.05***	.06***	.05**	.04*	.03	.02
(time since regime change)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
Timing lustration squared	−.001	−.0002	−.003***	−0.003*	−.002	−.0008	−.0004
	(.0007)	(.0009)	(.0009)	(.001)	(.001)	(.003)	(.003)
Presence/absence lustration	.29	.49**	−.13	−.13	−.08	3.86***	dropped
	(.16)	(.18)	(.18)	(.24)	(.23)	(.24)	
Letki lustration measures	—	—	—	−.03	−.03	—	—
				(.02)	(.02)		
Harsh/lenient	—	—	—	—	—	.09***	.08***
(Kaminski and Nalepa measure)						(.02)	(.02)
Trans justice measures	.14***	.15***	—	—	—	—	—

(continued)

Table 7. (continued)

Models DV: Composite of trust in judiciary, police, press, army (aggregated avg)

	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c[1]	Model 2d	Model 2e	Model 2f	Model 2g
(Stan's three TJ factors)	(.02)	(.02)					
Multiple Measures Lustration	—	—	.10*** (.02)	—	—	—	—
Sample Size	72	69	69	62	64	46	48
Log likelihood	85.45	79.38	68.7	50.85	53.98	48.1	47.14

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 two tailed t test

Cross sectional time series Feasible Generalized Least Squares Regression results. Constant terms not reported.

[1]All IV permutations yield similar results when multiple measures is the lustration variable tested, so only one reported.

not explain this result. What is most striking is that democratic freedom levels are not rising consistently over this time period. Although levels of democratization have improved in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania between 1997 and 2009, in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania democracy levels have all gone down (see Table 7). Some countries, such as Slovakia, had early success, only to see levels of democratization stabilize, then worsen. Many of the countries perceived to be more stable democracies have declining levels of democracy over this time period, hence affecting the negative sign on the democracy variable.

Neither measure of economic growth (either GDP growth or GDP per capita growth) is ever significant in the models. Conversely, all measures of corruption are significant and robust across the models. More corruption is associated with less trust in public institutions. This suggests that measurement choices—for corruption or economic growth—are not factors in determining variable significance in these models. Economic growth does not make public institutions more trustworthy, but higher levels of perceived corruption do undermine perceptions of the trustworthiness of public institutions.

In sum, countries with more extensive lustration programs, more severe lustration programs, and more extensive transitional justice measures have higher levels of trust in public institutions. The relationship is consistently

significant irrespective of variable specification. Timing of lustration does not matter in the way hypothesized. Early lustration is not always better. Timing is not linearly related to trust building. Higher levels of corruption consistently undermine trust in public institutions as well. Economic growth is not a significant predictor of trust in public institutions, and democracy is not a consistent predictor of trust.

Model 2: Dependent Variable: Trust in Less Politicized Public Institutions

The dependent variable in this series of models is a composite of slightly different, less politicized public institutions: the judiciary, the police, the press, and the army. In this series of models lustration remains a significant predictor of greater trust in public institutions. Similar to the previous models, both multiple transitional justice measures and multiple lustration measures are significant across all of the models (2a-2c). (See Table 7). The model specification did not affect the degree of confidence in the significance of this variable. More lustration and more transitional justice are consistently associated with more institutional trust.

Predicted value estimations indicated that an increase in multiple measures of lustration resulted in a 3.33% to 5% increase in levels of trust in public institutions. This is slightly greater than the magnitude of effect of this variable in Model 1b. The impact of transitional justice measures on trust in institutions decreases in these models (2a–2b), with trust increasing by only 0.21% to 0.3% for each shift in category. The difference between those countries that resisted transitional justice attempts and those countries that embraced vigorous and quick programs is a difference of less than 1% trust in institutions (0.63% to 0.91%). As such, although transitional justice programs are significant and robust predictors of trust in public institutions, their magnitude of effect is almost 5 times smaller than that of lustration alone (Models 2a–2c).

Kaminski and Nalepa's severity of lustration measure is significant across all the models (2f–2g), suggesting again that severe sanctions are robustly associated with more trust in public institutions. Predicted value calculations estimate that for every shift in category, there is an increase in trust in institutions by 1.10%. In terms of substantive impact, harsher lustration improves trust in institutions by approximately 1% more than mild lustration, and harsh lustration improves trust in public institutions by approximately 2.2% more than no lustration. Letki's early assessment of lustration programs is still not a significant variable in any of the models (Model 2e reported). Letki's older

assessment of lustration is substantially different from the other measures and is consistently not significant as a predictor of trust. However, her initial rubric was a helpful starting point for analyzing lustration and should be viewed as a step in the cumulation of knowledge about lustration specifically and transitional justice more broadly over the past decade.

Timing yields slightly different results with this dependent variable. Early lustration is generally positive and significant, suggesting that early lustration improves trust in public institutions. However, in models in which multiple lustration or Letki's lustration measure is included, timing and timing squared are positive and significant. This suggests that there is a nonlinear component to timing. Timing does not appear to matter in models in which the severity of lustration is included. In sum, timing is much more theoretically and empirically complicated than has previously been argued. Timing cannot be represented consistently as a linear function. When examining transitional justice measures, early transitional justice increases trust in public institutions in the expected linear way. However, when simply looking at *lustration* measures, as opposed to broader transitional justice measures, timing is better represented as an inverted *U*-shaped function.

Corruption was consistently significant in the models. Higher levels of perceived corruption undermine trust in public institutions in all the models and with all the measures of lustration. However, economic growth does not consistently or significantly affect citizen perceptions of institutional trustworthiness. This is contrary to popular belief that citizen trust is driven by the change in the material benefits provided by public institutions. Democracy was not a consistent predictor of trust or distrust in public institutions. Once again, democracy was negatively signed, showing that declining democracy was associated with higher levels of trust. The best one can say is that under certain model specifications, democracy is sometimes a predictor of institutional distrust.

In sum, multiple measures of lustration, the timing of lustration, the severity of lustration, and transitional justice measures are all consistent and significant predictors of trust in public institutions. Timing remains a more complex variable than has been theorized in the literature, with linear and nonlinear relationships observed. Corruption was the only control variable that consistently and significantly affected trust in public institutions as expected, with higher perceived corruption depressing trust. As in the previous models, democracy and economic growth were not consistently significant predictors of institutional trust, and variable measurement did not affect their significance.

Table 8. Effects of Lustration on Trust in National Government (2001–2009)

	Model 3a	Model 3b	Model 3c	Model 3d	Model 3e	Model 3f	Model 3g
square root % change GDP	—	−.04	—	.006	—	.21	—
(two year lagged)		(.1)		(.10)		(.13)	
% change GDP/ capita	−.008*	—	−.009*	—	−.008	—	-.01*
(two year lagged)	(.004)		(.004)		(.005)		(.004)
sq inverse Dem freedom	−.05***	−.04**	−.05***	−.04**	.01	.02	−.02
(Freedom house)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.01)
Freedom from Corruption	.03***	—	.02***	—	—	—	.02***
(Heritage foundation)	(.006)		(.006)				(.006)
square inverse corruption	—	−.02***	—	−0.02**	−.02**	−.01	—
(CPI, Transparency Intl)		(.007)		(.007)	(.007)	(.009)	
Timing lustration	−.02	−.0004	−.01	.01	.22*	.30**	−.06
(time since regime change)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.10)	(.11)	(.06)
Timing lustration squared	.006	.004	.003	.0005	−.03**	−.04**	.005
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.01)	(.01)	(.004)
Presence/ absence lustration	1.74*	1.14	1.18	.49	dropped	dropped	1.38
(dummy control)	(.76)	(.85)	(.71)	(.76)	collinearity	collinearity	(.78)
Letki lustration measures	—	—	—	—	—		−.16**
							(.06)
Harsh/lenient (Kaminski and Nalepa measure)	—	—	—	—	.02 (.07)	.08 (.07)	—

(continued)

Table 8. (continued)

	Model 3a	Model 3b	Model 3c	Model 3d	Model 3e	Model 3f	Model 3g
Transitional justice measures	.19*	.18	—	—	—	—	—
(Stan's three TJ factors)	(.09)	(.09)					
Multiple Measures lustration	—	—	.21**	.17*	—	—	—
			(.08)	(.09)			
Sample Size	81	78	80	77	54	52	72
Log likelihood	−34.28	−35.42	−33.51	−35.22	−17.14	−17.41	−31.05

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001, two tailed t test
Cross sectional time series Feasible General Least Squares regression results reported, clustered by country code.
Constant terms estimated but not reported.

Model 3: Dependent Variable: Trust in National Government

The dependent variable in this series of models is trust in national government. (See Table 8). As discussed, one should expect to see a diluted impact of lustration given the multiple performance factors that affect citizens' perceptions of the trustworthiness of national government.

Economic performance matters in these models. Growth in GDP per capita improves citizen perceptions of trust in national government. This relationship was robust and significant in all the models, except for the ones employing Kaminski and Nalepa's severity measure. Corruption remains significant, suggesting that higher levels of perceived corruption decrease citizen trust in government. Both corruption levels and economic performance measures reflect performance assessments of government and perceptions of the fairness and legitimacy of government. As such, both are predicted and observed to affect trust in government.

Democracy remains negatively signed when it is significant. As measures of democratic freedom go down, trust in national government goes up. This remains an unexpected finding, until one examines the countries with declining trust levels in the study: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Lithuania, for example (see Table 7). These countries still have higher measures of democracy than regional laggards such as Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania. Therefore,

one observes declining democracy within countries concurrent with rising trust in government.

Lustration and transitional justice measures have an impact but an inconsistent one. Although they remain significant in some but not all models, their level of significance has decreased. Predicated value estimates show that when transitional justice factors are significant, they have an expected impact on trust in government of approximately 0.06% per category. This means that a shift from weak transitional justice to mild transitional justice or from mild transitional justice to vigorous and quick transitional justice results in a 0.06% change in trust. By contrast, multiple lustration measures have a predicted impact of between 5.7% and 7.5% on trust in national government. The severity of lustration was never significant in predicting trust in national government. Therefore, there is a conditional and in some cases diminished impact for lustration and transitional justice measures on trust in national government.

The timing of lustration is largely insignificant in the models. This is in sharp contrast to the consistently significant role for timing in the other models. The exception involves models in which the severity of lustration is considered. In those models timing is again represented as a nonlinear relationship, although lustration is not significant in those models.

In sum, these models add more nuance to our understanding of the impact of lustration and transitional justice on trust in public institutions and national government. As expected, lustration has an impact but a lesser impact on trust in national government than on trust in directly targeted public institutions. The severity of lustration measures was not significant, and timing of lustration did not appear to affect trust in government. However, economic performance measures do affect citizens' perceptions of trust in national government, as does level of perceived corruption. These findings are consistent with studies showing how performance affects citizens' perceptions of trust in government. Lustration matters, but only indirectly, somewhat inconsistently, and therefore in a much more diluted way.

Conclusion

This study of lustration and trust in public institutions shows that lustration does have a positive and beneficial effect on citizen trust in public institutions. Multiple measures of lustration are always highly significant and positive predictors of trust in public institutions. This holistic measure of the scope, intensity, and actual implementation of lustration as a form of transitional justice was the single most consistently significant predictor of institutional

trustworthiness in all the models. It was the only variable that was always significant, irrespective of the dependent variable or the model specification.

The timing of lustration matters, but not in the way traditionally approached in the literature. Timing does not present a simple linear relationship with trust building. Because of the inverted *U* shape of the relationship between timing and trust, the peak of efficacy might be later in the transition process, although the exact tipping point is not known. So although one can assert that very late lustration does have a negative relationship with trust building, the assumption that only early lustration is efficacious is not supported by the analysis. Timing presents a complex relationship with lustration and trust building and disconfirms assumptions in the literature that only early lustration is beneficial.

The severity of lustration variable provides suggestive evidence that harsher lustration programs might improve trust in public institutions. Changes in the severity of lustration affected trust by approximately 2%, with more severe lustration having a greater impact on trust. This suggests that lustration programs with more institutional change, not simply symbolic change, have a greater impact on trust building.

Transitional justice measures do contribute to trust building. More comprehensive and expeditious transitional justice measures did positively and significantly improve trust in targeted public institutions. However, one should note that lustration has consistently had the largest impact on trust building. Predicted value calculations suggest that more transitional justice improves trust by at most 2.13% and at the very least less than 1%. In some cases, the impact of a host of transitional justice measures on trust building was one fifth the impact of lustration alone. Therefore, although transitional justice measures address a range of post-transition issues, including memory politics, justice concerns, and restitution issues, they appear to have less of a direct impact on trust building than lustration alone.

Trust in national government is different from trust in public institutions. Because it is not directly targeted by lustration measures, there is a hypothesized and observed indirect positive impact of lustration on trust in national government. Economic performance and corruption were consistent and significant predictors of trust in national government. This suggests that trust in national government cannot be directly affected by lustration and transitional justice in the same way that selected targeted public institutions can be. This should not be interpreted to mean that lustration is irrelevant. Instead, it suggests that lustration is an indirect factor affecting citizen perceptions of trust, whereas economic performance and perceptions of corruption directly affect citizen assessments of trust in government.

It is of course not possible to isolate the impact of lustration policies or transitional justice measures on trust, when there are so many concurrent economic, political, and social changes going on in these transitional economics. The predicted value estimations show that changes in lustration have a relatively small effect on shifts in levels of trust, affecting perceptions of trust in public institutions by at most 5%, and trust in national government by at most 7.5%. Therefore, other factors are clearly affecting citizens' changing perceptions of the trustworthiness of public institutions. However, this study has shown that more lustration and consistent lustration is robustly associated with improved perceptions of institutional trustworthiness. Given the important role attributed to trust and social capital in postauthoritarian transitions, this change is not inconsequential.

The lustration literature has debated whether lustration supports or undermines trust in public institutions and the larger process of democratic consolidation. This study provides some preliminary but compelling and robust answers to that debate. The findings presented here should help to move past these initial questions regarding *whether* lustration undermines or enhances trust in public institutions across CEE and toward more nuanced assessments of *how* different types of lustration programs might affect levels of institutional trust. Future studies should engage the question of when to stop lustrating. At some point in time it is reasonable to expect there will be diminishing marginal utility. Ascertaining that point prior to reaching citizen fatigue with lustration is also vital if public institutions and national governments are to further the process of democratic consolidation.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

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Notes

1. There is no consensus on a single definition of lustration. This is partially a function of the fact that lustration is often defined in terms of the legal form it took in a given country and/or the intention of the policies. It is also a result of the substantial regional variations in terms of content, intention, and implementation in lustration over the past 15 years. As such, I have opted for a minimalist definition of lustration, capturing the consensual elements. See Hatschikjan (2004) for

a series of papers and debates revolving around two questions: What is lustration, and what is its impact?

2. This data set reflects all the years with data on trust in institutions and national government provided by Eurobarometer.

3. The coding of the timing of lustration reflects standard practices used in similar policy models, such as the impact of age on voter turnout (see Donovan, Tolbert, & Smith, 2009). Before lustration is enacted, the absence of lustration is coded as the difference between 2009 and the year of regime change. After enactment, timing is coded as the difference between the year of the lustration policy and the year of regime change. I am thankful to Todd Donovan for suggesting the introduction of a nonlinear functional representation for time.

4. When correlations are run among all four measures, the sample is limited by the Kaminski and Nalepa variable ($n = 59$), and the correlations are inflated. Without the Kaminski and Nalepa variable, the sample size increases and the correlations decrease ($n = 89$). The range is presented here for the purposes of illustrating the potential problems with multicollinearity should all the measures be tested in a single model. Complete correlation tables are available from the author.

5. I am grateful to the first anonymous reviewer for suggesting the grouping of the dependent variables into politicized and less politicized public institutions.

6. Freedom House's corruption measures were more comprehensive than Transparency International's, however they were highly correlated with Freedom House's democracy scores (for transformed data, Pearson's $r = .87$). Therefore, to avoid collinearity problems, the two measures of corruption with the lowest correlations were used (TI and Heritage Foundation). For a discussion of the sensitivity of corruption measures see Treisman (2007).

7. Transformations of some of the variables were performed to improve the distribution of the values. The inverse of Freedom House's democracy score and CPI corruption scores are used, so that higher numbers correspond to more democracy or more corruption. The square of the inverse of democratic freedom and the square of the inverse of CPI measures were used in the regression analyses. The square root of the percentage change in GDP was used in the analyses. Note, I also estimated ordinary least squares regressions with robust (White) standard errors, clustered by country, with similar results. Therefore, I have reported only the cross-sectional times series feasible generalized least squares results. All other regression results are available from the author.

8. All models run with either Stan or multiple measures specifications yielded similar results, so only one emblematic model is reported for each variable.

9. Estimating the tipping point of the inverted *U* would not yield substantive results given the short time period of this study and relatively small *N*. Timing cubed was also tested to determine if there was an *S*-shaped nonlinear relationship between

timing and trust. Timing cubed was not statistically significant, and as a result it was dropped.

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Bio

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